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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASE
Faisal I. Chaudhry*
This Article reconsiders the drugs-for-the-developing world
debate that has taken place in the shadow of free trade
liberalization. For the last twenty years, this debate has centered on
a supposedly zero-sum conflict between access to drugs for
residents of the “third world” and incentives for pharmaceutical
multinationals to invest in research and development. Underlying
this debate is the assumption that the developing-world health crisis
involves primarily a crisis of infectious disease. Because drugs for
such ailments lack developed world markets, it is easy to imagine
that robust pharmaceutical patents are globally necessary if the
poor are to obtain any drugs at all. Global public health reality,
however, is quite different. Mortality and morbidity in developing
countries are increasingly attributable to those same noncommunicable diseases (“NCDs”) that plague developed countries.
Drugs for such conditions already have highly profitable developed
world markets. Therefore, making developing-world populations
pay patent-inflated prices encourages rent-seeking by
multinationals rather than incentivization. While little noticed in the
developed world, the importance of the NCD crisis has not been lost
on developing world actors. This Article is the first to document a
recent worldwide trend of developing-world courts and
administrative agencies breaking with strict patent rights for NCD
drugs. It argues that attentive policy makers can seize the
opportunity provided by the crisis that developed world populism is
creating for liberalizing globalization. If renegotiating free trade is
back on the agenda, they need only look to what developing
countries have already been doing, at least in the realm of
intellectual property rights.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The populist upsurge of 2016 in the Atlantic world has brought
many surprises; the election of Donald Trump in the United States
and Britain’s vote to leave the European Union being two of the
most visible. While the outcome of these developments is yet to be
fully determined, it is obviously difficult to see them other than as
signs of a crisis in the prevailing world order. As is the case with
any crisis, however, its indicia may foretell unpredictable
opportunities as well. Of course, the Trump administration’s
immediate move to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP)1—international economic law’s most recent hope for
advancing globalization—may foretell a slight adjustment rather
than any real reversal to the liberalizing commitment. At the same
time, whatever its source, greater attention to the possible inequities
of the global trading system still portends more of a chance that the
terms of free trade liberalization will be reconsidered than has been
the case at any previous time in recent memory.
Although many questions remain unanswered—including
whether the Trump administration will end up simply pursuing a
bilateral, rather than multilateral, version of the free trade status
quo—some things are for certain. Among these certainties is that
growing populist scrutiny of liberalizing free trade’s achievements
has now dovetailed with a mounting concern in places like the U.S.
and Britain over out-of-control pharmaceutical costs, a problem that
had once seemed to plague health systems in the developing world
alone. In the U.S., for example, consumer outrage reached its most
fevered pitch amidst the dramatic 600% price increase in Mylan,
N.V.’s EpiPen epinephrine auto-injector in the late summer of
2016.2 At the very same time, on the other side of the Atlantic,
Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) turned down Roche
1

For the origins of the TPP, see Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4
Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks
and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 401 (2009).
2
The controversy elicited a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of Mylan
N.V., which was settled in August, 2017, for $465 million. See Nate Raymond,
Mylan, U.S. Finalize $465 Million EpiPen Settlement, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mylan-epipen/mylan-u-s-finalize-465million-epipen-settlement-idUSKCN1AX1RW.
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Pharmaceutical’s blockbuster breast cancer therapy Kadcyla for the
second time in two years.3 Running more than $100,000 per patient
per year, the NHS declared the patent-protected drug simply too
expensive,4 especially given Roche’s own cost of just over $100.5
Of course, for those versed in the last twenty years of the debate
pitting the need for essential medicines for the world’s poor against
the intellectual property rights (“IP” or “IPRs”) of pharmaceutical
multinationals, it may seem naïve to imagine that the actual cost of
Kadcyla is so little. After all, such debate commenced from the clear
support of our era’s foundational free trade agreement, the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), for the upward harmonization of
national IPR standards.6 The WTO’s annex on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”)7 has thus supported
strong patent rights in the name of enabling firms like those in the
pharmaceutical sector to recoup the hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of dollars they claim to spend on developing new
medicines.8 Yet there remains an important difference between the
3

Kadcyla is the brand name for trastuzumab emtansine. As discussed in Part
V, Roche has been involved in conflict over a patent on the unadorned form of
trastuzumab, or Herceptin, in India.
4
John Ainger, Make Drugmakers Pay: England’s Strategy for Cancer
Medicines,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(July
28,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/cancer-drugs-fundrevamp-means-drugmakers-shoulder-overspending.
5
Lois Rogers, Sickening Rip Off, THE DAILY MAIL (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-3321121/Sickening-rip-Smallermatchstick-year-s-dose-life-extending-blood-cancer-drug-NHS-pays-115-000costs-just-100-make.html.
6
See Frederick M Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the
World Economic System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 499 (1998).
7
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
8
The most widely cited (and criticized) figures come from Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development. The Center’s 2003 study reported the $800 million
number (or $1 billion in 2013 dollars). That figure became $2.6 billion by the time
the Center undertook its 2013 updated study. Although the 2014 study is
inaccessible online, for the official summary, see Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G.
Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016). For concern about
the study, see Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New Estimate
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intensifying concern about drug costs in the “first world” and the
standing debate about access to medicines in the “third world.” Even
without the proprietary information required for a true accounting,
the ordinary inhabitant of the developed world would still likely balk
at such figures. Instead, inhabitants of the developed world would
feel only vaguely trapped by dire warnings of a greater number of
their countrymen left to die or suffer in a counterfactual world
without any drugs at all, absent $99,000-plus markups.

Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-ofdeveloping-a-new-drug.html?_r=1. See also MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800
MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004). More
recently, dueling (and very different) estimates of R&D costs have emerged. See
Joseph A. DiMasi, H.G. Grabowski & R.W. Hansen, Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20
(2016) (sampling 106 randomly selected drugs from ten large pharmaceutical
firms to arrive at a total pre-approval cost estimate of $2.558 billion in 2013);
Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring
a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, JAMA: INTERNAL
MED.
(Sep.
11,
2017),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2653012 (using the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s reports for investors to arrive at total R&D figures for
cancer drugs put out by ten companies in the period from 2007 to 2015 and finding
a median cost of $648 million). For a discussion of limitations of DiMasi’s paper
and problems accessing its underlying data, see James Love, Perspectives on
Cancer Drug Development Costs in JAMA, HARV. L. BILL OF HEALTH (Sept. 13,
2017), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2017/09/13/perspectives-on-cancerdrug-development-costs-in-jama/. As Love notes, these various controversies
about R&D costs are entirely aside from whether R&D outlays are even relevant
to determining pharmaceutical prices, which a great deal of evidence suggests
they are not, given that companies instead charge what they think the market can
bear. As he notes, the back and forth also fails to give much attention to the
misleading character of industry averages of R&D costs given how wide variation
for different drugs tends to be. Love gives the example of Spinraza, a drug that
runs up to $750,000 for one year’s course of treatment. He cites a study by
Knowledge Ecology International, developed largely through government grants,
calculating its risk-adjusted R&D costs at $40 million. Id. For the latter
calculation, see Andrew Goldman, Written Submission in Support of HB 666,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.keionline.org/
sites/default/files/KEI-Goldman-HB666-transparency-16March2017Maryland.pdf.
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The overall aim of this Article is to ask why such warnings seem
much more compelling when thinking about illness in the
developing world. The article’s answer is that such warnings have
long taken on a surface plausibility for low and middle-income
countries9 due to highly restricted assumptions about the diseases
faced by these countries’ inhabitants. The public health crisis in the
developing world has thus been construed largely, if not entirely, in
terms of communicable or infectious diseases (like tuberculosis and
malaria).10 From its very outset, the drugs-for-the-developing world
debate involved both critics and supporters of TRIPS alike focused
mainly on drugs for diseases that had no effective markets in highincome countries (except for the unique case of HIV/AIDS).11 As a
result, it has always implicitly drawn on fact scenarios that make
choosing between competing normative considerations about
ensuring access to drugs and incentivizing their production to seem
like a zero-sum dilemma.
In coming to my own normative argument, this Article
highlights a shift now taking place in the nature of health crisis in
the developing world. This involves non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) increasingly replacing infectious diseases as the highest
cause of morbidity and mortality in low and middle-income
countries. This shift is crucial because NCDs entail drugs that do
have markets in the developed world and highly profitable markets
by the multinational pharmaceutical sector’s own account.12
9

For simplicity’s sake, the term “low- and middle-income countries” is used
equivalently with “developing countries/world.” For a proper description of these
categories, see infra notes 60–61.
10
I will use the terms communicable disease and infectious disease
interchangeably, though they have slightly different definitions. According to the
World Health Organization (WHO), communicable diseases are generally those
ailments that can be transmitted from person-to-person, while “[i]nfectious
diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses,
parasites or fungi” and “can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to
another.” Health Topics: Infectious Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
11
For simplicity’s sake, the term “high-income countries” is used equivalently
with “developed countries/world.” For a proper description of this category, see
infra note 61.
12
For a more detailed discussion of these points, see infra Sections IV and V.
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Developed world markets can amortize real research and
development (R&D) costs. NCD drugs make it strikingly clear that,
rather than being necessary to incentivize away from a world
without medicines, pushing for patent-inflated pricing through the
upward harmonization of a national IP regime design in developing
countries is likely a form of rent-seeking.
Our existing debate has obscured this reality through an
ostensibly context-free mode of “in theory” argument (even as it has
implicitly equated the problem of “third world” health with the
impact of non-remunerative infectious disease). In the process, it has
created the misleading sense that the normative aims of access and
incentivization entail an imminent tradeoff. If we instead consider
the growing NCD crisis the developing world is facing, we begin to
see how legal and administrative conflicts in low and middleincome countries have been shifting in recent years. Accordingly,
this Article is the first of its kind to unveil how low and middleincome countries have increasingly moved toward contesting strict
patent rights on drugs for conditions like cancer, cardiovascular
disease, and assorted chronic ailments. As I contend, this shift
amounts to a wave of strategic action recalibrating focus onto those
fact scenarios that are the least likely to trigger an imminent zerosum tradeoff between access and incentivization.
Little-noticed by academics and policy makers in the developed
world, both of these shifts—in the profile of disease burden and the
pattern of legal/administrative conflict in the developing world—
have been afoot since 2010. Preceding the current populist upsurge
for renegotiating the terms of free trade in places like the U.S. and
Britain by more than a half-decade, these shifts furnish a ready
template for law and policy makers to draw on when addressing the
more specific questions they will now face about rewriting the rules
of national IP regime design. Therefore, making sense of the shifting
contexts that inform questions about pharmaceutical access versus
incentivization in the way is of vital importance. This, moreover, is
not simply with respect to the inhabitants of the developing world,
but also to those outside of its borders—especially in the United
States. If bipartisan action against out-of-control drug prices in the
U.S. does materialize, opposition based on the supposed imminence
of the access-incentivization dilemma will grow much louder.
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To pursue its descriptive and normative goals, this Article
proceeds in five parts. Part II previews the shifting landscape of
conflict over IPRs and access to medicines. A landmark 2013
decision is briefly discussed in which the Indian Supreme Court
rejected the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis’ patent application
for a prominent anti-cancer drug due to its lack of inventiveness.
One of a growing number, the case is used as a launching point for
the more telescopic perspective this Article provides. Part III turns
to a brief historical account of how the remote theoretical tension
between pharmaceutical access and incentivization became an
urgent conundrum after the founding of the WTO. This tension grew
in tandem with the rise of a debate on drugs-for-the-developing
world rooted in concerns about TRIPS’ impact on the well-being of
the world’s poor. Part IV examines the picture of the public health
crisis in the developing world as an over-looked crisis of infectious
disease; it also emphasizes the changing nature of illness in low and
middle-income countries due to the (ongoing) explosion of health
and economic loss from NCDs. Part V contemplates how, despite
the ambiguities of normative IP theory and the place of patents in
any country’s innovation system, the access-incentivization
dilemma has nonetheless been further mapped onto a dichotomy
between short-term ethics and the long-term rationality of
economics. This section will describe how assuming a factual
backdrop of infectious disease effectively buttressed the prevailing
status quo in favor of strict approaches to patent rights and the
upward harmonization of national IP regime design.13 Finally, Part
VI documents the burgeoning examples, since 2010, of courts and
administrative agencies developing countries engaging in new
forms of strategic action to break with strict patent rights in the
context of NCD drugs.
13

Here, “upward harmonization” means both a harmonization toward the new
“minimum” standards of TRIPS that have been in place since the 1990s, as well
as the ongoing push to make those standards more exacting. For more on the term
“harmonization” as used in this context, see, for example, Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009). On efforts to
render the TRIPS framework more stringent through the outright supplementation
by so-called TRIPS-plus rules, see infra notes 41 and 51.
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II. PRELUDE: THE GLEEVEC CASE IN INDIA
We start with the most significant example of a developing
country—India—breaking from strict IPR for NCD drugs in recent
years. In 2013, after years of controversy, India’s Supreme Court
upheld an administrative decision to deny Swiss Pharmaceutical
giant Novartis a patent for Gleevec, a blockbuster cancer drug.14
The patent for Gleevec’s underlying compound, known
chemically as imatinib, was first filed in Switzerland in 1992.15 By
1997, Novartis created the salt version of imatinib that was marketed
as Gleevec. 16 In 1998, it applied for a patent on Gleevec in India with
the Chennai branch of the Indian Patent Office (IPO).17 As with the
other controversies documented in Part V, the battle lines over
Gleevec were drawn around the issue of whether the modifications
Novartis made to the underlying compound made it a new
invention.18
When Novartis applied for protection in India, its IP laws
allowed only for process patents.19 However, as an incoming WTO
member state, India was required under TRIPS to also legalize
product patents. After India passed relevant amendments to the India
Patents Act in 2002 (and again in 2005), Novartis reapplied to the
IPO for protection in 2005.20
In January 2006, the IPO issued a series of orders responding to
five separate pre-grant oppositions to Novartis’ application.21 Under
14

Novartis v. Union of India & Others, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India).
Archive of Patent Applications for Imatinib and Derivatives, EUR. PATENT
OFFICE:
ESPACENET,
https://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails
/inpadocPatentFamily?CC=US&NR=5521184A&KC=A&FT=D&ND=3&date=
19960528&DB=worldwide.espacenet.com&locale=en_EP (last visited Nov. 10,
2017).
16
Information on European Patent No. WO9903854 (A1), EUR. PATENT
OFFICE:
ESPACENET,
https://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/
biblio?CC=WO&NR=9903854&KC=&FT=E&locale=en_EP (last visited Nov.
10, 2017).
17
See Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India).
18
Id.
19
Kapczynski, supra note 13, at 1577.
20
Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at paras. 13–14 (India).
21
Under four of these five orders, the commissioner determined that the
invention Novartis was claiming had been anticipated by prior publication, that it
15
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the most important of these orders, the IPO determined that Gleevec,
a modified salt form of imatinib, did not pass muster under Section
3(d) of the Patents Act, which spells out criteria for “What are not
Inventions.”22 Novartis appealed to India’s newly formed
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and filed two new
petitions with the Madras Supreme Court—one challenging the
constitutionality of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act and another its
TRIPs-compliance.23 The court dismissed both petitions in 2007.24
Notably, in the process, the IPAB reversed the IPO’s declaration
that the salt version of imatinib had been anticipated in earlier patent
filings outside of India; it also reversed the declaration that the
modified drug failed to qualify as a non-obvious invention.25
However, the IPAB endorsed the IPO’s decision that Novartis failed
to clear Section 3(d)’s “requirement of higher standard of inventive
step [sic]” and its more stringent standards for what counted as
“patentable in India.”26 Thus, the IPAB backed the Madras High
Court’s view upholding the constitutionality of Section 3(d) and its
underlying aim of “prevent[ing] evergreening” and “provid[ing]
easy access to the citizens of the country to life saving drugs.”27
Novartis next leapfrogged to the High Court, bringing a
subsequent challenge directly to India’s Supreme Court in 2011.28
After more than two years of proceedings, with much fanfare and
was obvious to a person skilled in the art in light of previously published patents,
that the priority date of July 18, 1997, had been wrongly claimed for the patent
application in India, and, therefore, that the alleged invention had also been
anticipated by the specification made in the Swiss application. Id. at para. 14.
22
Id.
23
Id. at para. 15.
24
Id.
25
Id. at para. 17.
26
Id. at para. 17 (quotations omitted). Since the Novartis decision, India has
pressed its defense of the Supreme Court’s view of the notion of inventive step to
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For its considered
submission, see STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., STUDY ON INVENTIVE STEP, SCP/22/3 (July 6, 2015),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_22/scp_22_3.pdf.
27
Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 18.
28
Novartis took advantage of Article 136 of the Indian Constitution to seek a
Special Leave Petition, arguing that any patent’s expiry was soon approaching in
2018. Id. at para. 21.
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controversy, in 2013 the Court denied Novartis a product patent on
Gleevec one last time. Although the decision was lengthy and
complex, it turned on the implications of what the Court called the
“redefin[ition of] the concepts of invention and patentability” in
Section 3 of the amended Patents Act.29
In addressing Section 3(d), the Court concluded that the salt
version of imatinib was not an “invention” under the Patents Act of
1970.30 It then went on to consider whether the salt qualified as an
invention in its own right. Here, while the Court accepted that the
salt could be counted as “new,” it did not further consider whether
it qualified as an “inventive step,”31 deeming the issue moot because
Gleevec “directly runs into section 3(d)” of the Patents Act.32 The
Court further elaborated that under Section 3(d), “inventions” must
enhance “the known efficacy” of a substance.33 Rather, for a drug
like Gleevec, the very “function, utility, or . . . purpose” of which
was to act as a medicinal therapy, “efficacy” could only mean
therapeutic efficacy.34 Accordingly, mere physico-chemical

29

Id. at para. 24. Under the subtitle “What are not Inventions,” after the 2005
amendment, the section reads as follows: “The following are not inventions within
the meaning of this Act, —(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known
substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
substance or the mere discovery of any new property . . . .” The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005, § 3(d), No. 15, Acts of Parliament (India).
30
Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 131 (“[W]e are completely unable
to see how Imatinib Mesylate can be said to be a new product, having come into
being through an ‘invention’ that has a feature that involves technical advance
over the existing knowledge and that would make the invention not obvious to a
person skilled in the art. Imatinib Mesylate is all there is . . . . It is a known
substance from the [previous] patent.”).
31
Id. at para. 158.
32
Id.
33
Id. at para. 180.
34
The Court determined that the “test of efficacy in the context of section 3(d)
would” not be the traditional dictionary definition of efficacy. As it further
explained, “in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of
efficacy can only be ‘therapeutic efficacy’ . . . judged strictly and narrowly.” Id.
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properties like “more beneficial flow” or “increased bioavailability”
were held to not be efficacy enhancing under Section 3(d).35
With this ruling, the Court endorsed the more robust standard of
patentability for modifications to existing compounds that the
Patents Act mandated after being amended to comply with TRIPS.36
At the same time, its stance was intentionally equivocal. The Court
thus highlighted not one, but two ways that Section 3(d) could be
read to heighten the bar for protection: first, as a provision “setting
up the standards of ‘patentability,’” and second, by “exten[ding] the
definition of ‘invention.’”37
The pharmaceutical industry immediately accused India of
showing a general hostility to IPR, the TRIPS, and fair play by
requiring a “second tier” criterion for pharmaceuticals to qualify as
patentable.38 Not surprisingly, then, the case was, and is, hardly
limited to its import to India alone. Since 2010 it has become the tip
of a larger iceberg of cases where developing countries are
challenging strict patent rights of drugs for non-communicable
conditions like cancer and cardiovascular disease, which is further
discussed in Part V.
While the Gleevec case is an example of developing countries
setting up higher standards of patentability, other mechanisms—like
compulsory licensing—have figured prominently in forming the
proverbial iceberg as well.39 As documented in Part VI, and as
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below, the Gleevec case is hardly an
isolated phenomenon. Is it, however, simply a coincidence that these
all involve drugs for NCDs rather than for infectious diseases? In
the remainder of this Article, I argue that it is not.
Rather, there is a fundamental shift afoot in the debate on access
to medicines and patents due to a new form of strategic action that
35

Id. at paras. 187–89. On the issue of bioavailability, the Court held that
bioavailability had to be “specifically claimed and established by research data.”
Id. at para. 189.
36
Amy Kapczynski, Engineered in India-Patent Law 2.0, 369 NEW ENGL. J.
MED 497, 497–98 (2013).
37
Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 190.
38
Interestingly, the Court peremptorily addressed this very accusation at length.
See id. at paras. 103–04.
39
See infra Part VI.
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developing countries are now undertaking. In trying to comprehend
this shift, however, we must first step back from the specificities of
individual cases and controversies. In doing so, we will be able to
broaden our perspective in two key ways. First, we will see how the
traditional drugs-for-the-developing world debate first materialized
and how it became emblematic of the supposedly zero-sum tradeoff
between access and incentivization. Second, we will see why the
shifting facts of the public health crisis in the developing world
demand law and policy makers to re-theorize the relationship
between the norms of access and incentivization in precisely the way
developing countries have been asking by breaking with strict IPR
for NCD drugs.
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Table 1: Recent Challenges to NCD-drug Patents based on
Heightening Bar for Patentability40

40

For discussion of the information in Table 1 and Table 2, see infra Part VI.
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Table 2: Recent Challenges to Strict NCD-drug patents based on
Compulsory Licensing
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III. STAGING THE ACCESS-INCENTIVIZATION DILEMMA: THE
LINKED HISTORIES OF FREE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE
DRUGS-FOR-THE-DEVELOPING WORLD DEBATE
Before discussing the developing world’s NCD crisis, Part III
begins by summarizing how the drugs-for-the-developing world
debate co-evolved with the rebuilding of the legal framework during
the post-Cold War economic liberalization. As the reader will see,
the linking of these histories has been crucial in making the
theoretical tension between pharmaceutical access and
incentivization appear intractable.
This narrative must begin with the founding of the WTO in
1994, amidst euphoria over a new world order (rhetorically)
premised on harmony and globalization. However, this euphoria
began to dampen within the WTO’s first decades of existence as
“politics” quickly began taking over “economics” as the governing
factor in world affairs after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. Early difficulties were clearly evident by 2004 with the
stymying of efforts to extend the spirit of multilateralism to the
liberalization of new areas like investment and financial services.41
Negotiations through the WTO process itself were also beset by
conflict, especially over agricultural subsidies.
Since 1994, the modern world has only once moved towards
more circumscribed regional/bilateral agreements as a second-best
alternative for advancing liberalization.42 Between this first retreat
from a more ambitious agenda of multilateral globalization and our
now impending reversion to the same tendency in the wake of

41

E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1868 U.N.T.S. 186.
42
See Mohammed El-Said, The Road from TRIPS-Minus, to TRIPS, to TRIPSPlus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD INT. PROP. 53 (2005);
Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: the Chile-USA Free
Trade Agreement, TRIPS-ISSUES PAPERS 4 (2004), http://law-wss01.law.fsu.edu/gpc2007/materials/roffe_ottowa2004.pdf; David Vivas-Eugui,
Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: the Free Trade Area
of
the
Americas
(FTAA),
TRIPS-ISSUES PAPERS
1
(2003),
http://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/3610-regional.pdf.
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populist upsurge of 2016,43 the pendulum has swung back in the
other direction. By 2011, at the same time that talks for the nowdefunct TPP were intensifying, parallel efforts to resume global
integration on a multilateral basis were taking place through other
treaties including the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, and the
Trade in Services Agreement.44 Additionally, bilateral treaties with
major economic powers like Korea and China were also either
approved or actively pursued in the last five years.45
Given the oscillations between multilateralism and bilateralism
within our ongoing era of post-Cold War globalization, it is easy to
forget that we are still only a generation removed from the
controversy the WTO ignited around IPRs and access to medicines.
Before 1994, while many developing countries allowed process
patents, TRIPS-compliance required WTO member states to allow
for product patents as well (and, as with process patents, in any field
of technology including pharmaceuticals).46 Concerns about the
impact of IPRs—and specifically, patents—on public health in the
developing world thus achieved broad social penetrance only after
the Uruguay round of negotiations of the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trades (resulting in the WTO). Moreover, it was only two
years later in 1996 that the first truly effective anti-retroviral
43

While the future is unclear, the Trump administration and conservatives in
Britain appear to be moving toward bi- or scaled-down multi-lateralism. See, e.g.,
Alan Wolff, Free Trade Is Not Dead Under Donald Trump, FORTUNE (Dec. 15,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/15/free-trade-donald-trump-tpp.
44
See Robert E. Lutz, Linking Trade, Intellectual Property and Investment in
the Globalizing Economy: The Interrelated Roles of FTAs, IP and the United
States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIAPACIFIC REGION 155–70 (Christopher Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015); Peter
K. Yu, Déjà Vu in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 113–29 (Matthew David & Debora
Halbert eds., 2014).
45
While the idea of a trans-Atlantic free trade area goes back to the 1990s, the
idea was revived by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2007 and pursued in
earnest only after 2011. See James Kanter & Jack Ewing, A Running Start for a
U.S.-Europe
Trade
Pact,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/business/global/obama-pledges-trade-pacttalks-with-eu.html.
46
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 27.1.
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therapies for HIV/AIDS became available.47 As many recall, a
turning point was reached in 1999 when global health activists
targeted then Presidential-hopeful Vice President Al Gore for
silence over the pharmaceutical lobby’s efforts to limit South Africa
in making the AIDS/HIV “triple cocktail” available to its citizens.48
Subsequently, the drive toward upward harmonization of
national IP regime design became more controversial as the deadline
for developing countries to comply with TRIPS approached (in
2005).49 The drugs-for-the-developing world controversy thus
increasingly became TRIPS’ legacy, especially for civil society
actors and the public.50 Already by 2001, at its Ministerial
Conference in Qatar, the WTO was compelled to issue its famed
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which was meant to
confirm the availability of various “exceptions” to strict IPRs.51
While the Doha Declaration did partially quell concern, worries
remained.52 Indeed, no sooner did member states endorse TRIPSflexibility in Qatar than the push for so-called TRIPS-plus
protections started to appear.53
By the late 2000s, the TRIPS-plus agenda was increasingly
becoming a default position in ongoing negotiations for TransAtlantic and Trans-Pacific integration. Therefore, at least one trend
that has been evident since 2011 will likely survive a return to
47

Jintanat Ananworanich & Joep M.A. Lange, The Discovery and
Development of Antiretroviral Agents, 19 ANTIVIRAL THERAPY (SUPPLEMENT 3)
5, 6 (2014), https://www.intmedpress.com/serveFile.cfm?sUID=c47b35046207-4956-a8d2-2e344a807db6.
48
Julian Borger, Gore Accused of Working Against Cheap Aids Drugs, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 1999, 20:47 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/1999/aug/10/uselections2000.usa.
49
The transition period, which has been extended for some countries, actually
varied for different categories of developing countries. See TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 7, at arts. 65, 66.
50
DAVID HULME, GLOBAL POVERTY: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POOR
PEOPLE IN THE POST-2015 ERA 188–89 (2d ed. 2015).
51
World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
52
See Charles T. Collins-Chase, The Case Against Trips-Plus Protection in
Developing Countries Facing Aids Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763 (2008).
53
Id.
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bilateral free trade under a Trump administration.54 Namely, this
trend is the continued pursuit of a TRIPS-plus agenda will occur side
by side with a period in which conflict over drug patents in the
developing world has become more acute than at any time since the
Doha Declaration. Indeed, even though countries like India and
Thailand never fully lost their place on the United States Trade
Representative’s (USTR) Priority Watch List for allegedly creating
barriers to trade, criticism of their IPR policy reached new heights
in the last five to six years.55
It is only against this larger backdrop that we can understand
how popular and scholarly discussion has come to portray the
relationship between patents and public health as intractable.56
Indeed, part of the reason behind this assumption is that the
normative dilemma imposed by the supposedly imminent tradeoff
between pharmaceutical access and incentivization has always been
three-fold. First, there is the normative demand of the new legal
regime enshrined in the TRIPS agreement. As a result, we ask not
about whether strict IPR/upward harmonization should be the norm
so much as how far countries should be allowed to move away from
the TRIPS rule through exceptions/flexibilities. Second, there is the
normative demand of neoclassical economic theory. As a result, we
tend to ask less about whether patents incentivize innovation than
we do about how far economic theory, as if speaking in one voice,
should be our only guide. It is only in a third and final sense that the
demand to decide how we should tradeoff long-term economic
54
If the impending talks about the fate of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) are any guide, this may have already started to be borne out.
See, e.g., Nicholas Caivano & Richard Elliott, Warning – A New NAFTA Could
Prevent Vital Medicines Getting to Millions Worldwide, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Aug.
19, 2017, 8:00 AM EDT), http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/caivanoand-elliott-warning-a-new-nafta-could-prevent-vital-medicines-getting-tomillions-worldwide.
55
The Priority Watch List is part of the “Special 301 Report” the USTR issues
annually. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Special 301: Its Requirements,
Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259 (1989); see also
Sean M. Flynn, Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Global Access to
Medicines, 7 J. GENERIC MED. 309 (2010).
56
See, e.g., George Wehrfritz, Thailand’s New Drug War, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 8,
2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/thailands-new-drug-war-97635.
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rationality and immediate-term ethics—in a world where avoiding
harm means avoiding infectious diseases—becomes normative
dilemma’s most visible face.
In the face of this seeming intractability at the heart of our
existing drugs-for-the-developing world debate, it seems that
opposition to the upward harmonization of national IP regime
design is not only growing but also increasingly fragile.57 Indeed,
ever since the founding of the WTO, the burden of proof has always
been firmly on those demanding less strict approaches to patents
rather than vice versa. The first-ever amendment to TRIPS, created
in January 2017, is telling in this regard. While it waives the
requirement that licenses issued to create generic versions of onbrand drugs should be restricted to a country’s own local market, it
simultaneously confirms how TRIPS’ “flexibility” has not only been
uncertain and largely unused for more than sixteen years but also
how its future use is likely to remain tightly restricted.58
Therefore, our overall existing drugs-for-the-developing world
debate has produced a double-edged sword. Advocating for access
to “essential medicines” through the exceptionality of TRIPSflexibilities has clearly been crucial. At the same time, some argue
that the access-incentivization dilemma is so acute that departing
from strict IPR would be an inevitable health crisis.
IV. “DISEASES OF CIVILIZATION” GO GLOBAL: THE
BURGEONING CRISIS OF NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASE IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD
Falling under the heading of NCDs are conditions such as
cancer, arteriosclerosis and other cardiovascular ailments, mental
illness, asthma and other chronic respiratory diseases, and a host of
other afflictions including type 2 diabetes, cirrhosis, and chronic
renal failure. Using data from 2008, in its first (and most recent)
global action plan on such conditions, the World Health
57

See Ellen Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents, and
Access to Medicines for All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 1 (2011).
58
World Trade Org., WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access
to
Affordable
Medicines,
WTO.ORG
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm.
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Organization (WHO) estimates that out of the 56 million annual
global deaths that occurred in 2008, some thirty-six million—or
nearly 63%—were due to NCDs.59
Traditionally seen as burdens on the health of developed country
populations alone, NCDs have been called both “diseases of
civilization” and “lifestyle” ailments. Accordingly, they are
generally linked to the patterns of diet, work, and leisure that
characterize the relatively more prosperous societies of the Global
North.
A. NCD-Related Health Loss in the Developing World
Such an impression, however, is mistaken—as the just-cited
figures from the WHO’s Global Action Plan on NCDs make clear
when broken down according to the location in which deaths
occurred .60 Already by 2008 only 20%—or seven million—of the
thirty-six million NCD-related deaths that year occurred in highincome countries, a group the WHO defines to include North
America outside of Mexico, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and a handful of
other countries.61 As Figure 1 shows, the other 80% of global NCDrelated deaths in 2008—making for a total of twenty-nine out of the
thirty-six million total—took place in low and middle-income
countries.62
59

World Health Org., Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of
Noncommunicable Diseases: 2013–2020 (adopted 2013) [hereinafter WHO,
Global Action Plan].
60
Id.
61
The WHO’s full list includes the Bahamas, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, and Brunei Darussalam. World Health Org., Global Burden of Disease:
2004 Update (2008) [hereinafter Global Burden of Disease]. According to the
World Bank’s Atlas method, high-income countries have a gross national income
per capita above $12,476 (measured from 2015). There are currently seventy-nine
such countries. World Bank Country and Lending Groups, THE WORLD BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
62
These two categories comprise the remainder of the world’s countries for the
WHO. In 2015 terms, its thirty-one current “low-income” countries have gross
national incomes per capita of $1,025 or less (and includes places like
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Nepal, and Uganda); its fifty-two lower-
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Longitudinal data provides more compelling evidence of NCD
burden on the developing world. By 1990, only 40% of the total
number of worldwide NCD-related deaths occurred in low and
middle-income countries, but by 2008, the proportion doubled to
80%.63 Furthermore, future projections estimate that by 2030 low
and middle-income countries will suffer fifty-five million annual
NCD-related deaths. 64

Proportion of Global Death Due to
NCD by Country Type 1990-2008
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Figure 1
In addition to suffering from an increasing proportion of total
global deaths, developing countries’ inhabitants will also die of

middle-income countries have gross national incomes per capita of $1,026 to
$4,035 (and includes places like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Honduras, India,
Morocco, Uzbekistan, and Zambia); its fifty-six current upper-middle-income
countries have gross national incomes per capita of $4,036 to $12,475 (and
includes places like Albania, Argentina, Ecuador, Lebanon, and Thailand). Id.
63
WHO Mortality
Database,
WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(2017),
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/.
64
WHO, Global Action Plan, supra note 58, at 7.
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NCD deaths at an earlier age.65 For example, in 2008, NCD-related
deaths accounted for 48% and 26% of deaths for persons under age
70 in the developing and developed worlds, respectively.66

Proportion of NCD-Related Deaths
in persons <70 years old (2008)
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Looking beyond actual deaths, a similar story is borne out by
assessing the impact of NCDs through the more nuanced metric of
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). Developed in the early
1990s by the World Bank and researchers at Harvard University, the
DALY has increasingly been adopted as a standard67 because it is
meant to capture the years of life lost due to premature deaths
(YLLs), as well as the years of life lost due to disability or poor

65

D.E. BLOOM ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM & HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH,
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES (2011)
[hereinafter HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden].
66
Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: Premature NCD Deaths, WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/gho/ncd/mortality_morbidity/ncd_premature_text/en/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2017).
67
See ALAN D. LOPEZ ET AL., GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE AND RISK FACTORS
3–4 (2006); Christopher Murray, Quantifying the Burden of Disease: The
Technical Basis for Disability-Adjusted Life Years, 72 BULL. WHO 429 (1994).
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health (YLDs).68 Equivalent to one lost year of “healthy” life, the
DALY thus represents a measure for quantifying the absolute health
loss resulting from both mortality and morbidity.
Based on the most current figures, as measured in DALYs, total
annual health loss in 2010 reached 2.49 billion, 31% of which came
from YLDs and the remaining 69% from YLLs.69 During the last
two decades, there has also been a marked overall decline—of
23%—in health loss per 1000 persons, from 472 DALYs in 1990 to
361 in 2010,70 as well as a sizeable increase in the percentage
composition of DALYs comprised by YLDs over YLLs.71
More important are the changes between 1990 and 2010 to the
respective contributions that NCDs have made to cumulative global
health loss. As Figure 3 shows, DALYs from NCDs have increased
in the developing world over the last twenty years (from 36% to
49%) but remained unchanged (at 83%) in the developed world
during the same time period.72 This was almost entirely due to the
increasing share of lost DALYs from NCDs in the developing
world.73
68
YLL’s are calculated by multiplying the number of deaths from a given
disease and a standard life expectancy for the age at which death occurs. YLD’s
are calculated by multiplying the number of incident cases in a given period, the
average duration in years of the disease case (until remission or death), and a
“disability weight,” a factor reflecting disease severity on a scale from 0,
representing perfect health, to 1, representing the state of being dead. LOPEZ ET
AL., supra note 67. Since its 2010 Global Burden of Disease study, the WHO has
modified this formula, with the YLD now reflecting the product of the disability
weight and the number of prevalent cases (rather than the product of incident cases
and case duration). Health Statistics and Information Systems-Metrics: DisabilityAdjusted Life Year, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
69
Christopher J.L. Murray et al., Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYS) for
291 Diseases and Injuries in 21 Regions, 1990–2010: A Systematic Analysis for
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, 380 THE LANCET 2197, 2210 (2012).
70
Id. at 2198, 2202.
71
Id. at 2213 (Figure 6).
72
Id. at 2198.
73
GBD (Global Burden of Disease) Compare, Data Visualization Tool, INST.
OF HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION, http://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017). Of course, there remains a large degree of
epidemiological variation. See Murray, supra note 69, at 2214.
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Proportion of DALYs Lost from Injury, NCDs
and CDs within Country Groups 1990 - 2010
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Of course, this is not to deny that there is some truth to the notion
that NCDs are diseases of the rich. For example, relative to overall
mortality burden within different country groups—whether
measured in DALYs or actual deaths—NCDs are responsible for
more of the total in high-income societies than in the low and
middle-income ones. 74 Likewise, within the developing world, it is
those with higher income who are more likely to be afflicted by
NCDs.75 However, both of these facts must be balanced against two
others. First, as noted above, a greater absolute number and a more
rapidly increasing share of total deaths due to NCDs are now taking
place within the developing world. (These sources of disparity,
moreover, will remain constant or increase in the future given the
higher rate of population growth in developing countries.) Second,

74

Global Burden of Disease, supra note 61, at 11.
HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 11. The
correlation is not fixed. In low and middle-income countries, the poorest can also
become the more seriously afflicted by NCDs. See Marc Suhrcke et al., CHRONIC
DISEASE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Oxford Health Alliance ed. 2006).
75
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within the low and middle-income country groups, less-affluent
inhabitants are more likely to die once afflicted by any given NCD.76
B. NCD-Related Economic Loss in the Developing World
As is the case for the burdensome effect of disease in general,
there can be little doubt of a close connection between health and
economic loss due to NCDs. The most obvious example of this
phenomenon is seen in the growing role of YLDs over YLLs in the
global composition of DALYs lost due to NCDs.77 In the developing
world in particular, the close connection between health and
economic loss due to NCDs is evidenced by the large and growing
share of the mortality burden shouldered by individuals of
reproductive78 or otherwise still working age.79 In an important 2005
study of the top 23 contributors to NCD-related health loss in the
developing world (that were responsible for some 80% of the
developing world’s total), it was projected that in the period from
2006 to 2015 the cost of lost national income from diabetes, stroke,
and heart disease alone would reach $84 billion.80
More recent attempts at examining economic loss have proven
even more eye-opening. They have also proved increasingly
sophisticated in terms of methodology, generally distinguishing lost
output and value of statistical life approaches for tabulating
economic loss from so-called “cost of illness” approaches. 81 The best
76

HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 11.
Murray, supra note 69, at 2213.
78
Id. at 2215. The reproductive age group generally ranges from ages 15–49.
Id. at 2211.
79
Suhrcke, supra note 75, at 11 (estimating that 80% of chronic NCD-DALY’s
in low and middle-income countries are 60 years old or younger).
80
Dele O. Abegunde et al., The Burden and Costs of Chronic Diseases in LowIncome and Middle-Income Countries, 370 THE LANCET 1929, 1929 (2007).
81
Value of lost output approaches focus on how NCDs affect gross domestic
product (GDP) through considering the role of disease in depleting a country’s
factors of production, including labor and capital. HSPH-WEF, The Global
Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 14. Cost of illness approaches look at both
direct and indirect NCD costs and consider factors like personal medical expenses
from diagnostic procedures, drugs, and inpatient/outpatient care; non-medical
expenses like for transportation for treatment; non-personal costs of information,
education, and research; and the loss of income. Id. The value of statistical life
77
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of these studies—by the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH)
in conjunction with the World Economic Forum (WEF) —provides
three separate projections for cumulative economic loss from NCDs
for the twenty-year period from 2010 to 2030: lost output and value
of statistical life (shown in Table 3) and cost of illness approach
(shown in Figure 4).
For lost output, the HSPH-WEF study finds that cancer,
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and
mental illness will cost low and middle-income countries an
enormous $21 trillion versus $25.5 trillion for high-income
countries over the same period.82
For the statistical life approach, the HSPH-WEF study tallies a
figure of $23.8 trillion in projected economic loss for low and
middle-income countries between 2010 and 2030 versus $20 trillion
in loss for high-income countries for the same time period.83
Table 3: Economic Loss from NCDs 2010 to 2030*
Measure

Low to MiddleIncome Countries

High-Income
Countries

Lost output

$21 Trillion

$25.5 Trillion

Value of Statistical
Life

$23.8 Trillion

$20 Trillion

Annualized %
Loss to World
Nominal Product

3.9% to 4.4%

2.1% to 2.7%

*Sources: HSPH, WEF, World Bank
On either approach, the HSPH-WEF study finds the average
expected annual cost to low and middle-income countries to be more
than $1 trillion (that is, $21 trillion or $23.8 trillion divided by 20
approach reflects a given population’s willingness to pay for reducing the risks of
NCD disability/death. Id.
82
Id. at 29 (calculating in US$ 2010).
83
Id. at 33.
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years). This annualized amount can be compared to the World
Bank’s latest data on low and middle-income countries’ contribution
to the world nominal product for 2015 ($27 trillion out of $74
trillion).84 Holding these figures constant for simplicity’s sake, low
and middle-income countries would be expected to experience an
average annual NCD-related economic loss of a striking 3.9% or
4.4% of their total contribution to world nominal product in any
given year up to 2030.85 This can be compared to the average annual
loss to world nominal product of 2.1% or 2.7% that high-income
countries would experience through 2030.86 Moreover, this does not
account for the premium that should be placed on each dollar lost in
the developing world relative to each lost in the developed world,
given the relative poverty of the former as compared to the latter and
what it means for the “marginal utility” of what is lost.
While summarizing the HSPH-WEF findings based on a cost of
illness approach is more difficult, the findings are largely in line
with the overall trends indicated by two other measuring
approaches. For example, the sum of the direct costs of diabetes in
low and middle-income countries is expected to increase from a
mere 9% to 75% from 2010 to 2030.87 A similar, though less
dramatic, story is true for the indirect costs associated with diabetes,
which would increase from 50% to 76% from 2010 to 2030.88 This
is balanced against what is expected to be only a slight shift in the
percentage of low and middle-income country inhabitants afflicted
with diabetes, from 74% of the global total of 285 million people in

84

WORLD BANK, GDP Ranking (Feb. 1, 2017), http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/GDP-ranking-table.
85
Lost output measure = US$21 trillion/20 years (world nominal product);
statistical life measure = US$23.8 trillion/20 years (world nominal product). Id.
86
Lost output measure = $US25.5 trillion/20 years (world nominal product);
statistical life measure = $US20 trillion/20 years (world nominal product). Id.
87
Conversely, the high-income country share of diabetes’ direct costs incurred
by high-income countries will drop from 91% of this total to only 25%. HSPHWEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 25.
88
Conversely, the high-income share of diabetes’ indirect costs will drop from
50% to 24% of the total. Id.

DEC. 2017]

IP and Non-Communicable Disease

203

2010 to 79% of a projected global total of 437 million persons in
2030.89
Developing Countries % of Total Global Costs
for Diabetes 2010-2030*
76
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Figure 4
*Total Direct Costs worldwide increased from $376 Billion to $486 Billion
*Total Indirect Costs worldwide increased from $96 Billion to $255 Billion

While the cost of illness approach may provide less digestible
aggregate headline figures, it is especially interesting because it
reckons with both the direct and indirect costs of NCDs. Compared
to other methods, it highlights that even though the drugs-for-thedeveloping world debate has focused on curative (pharmaceutical)
interventions, addressing public health crises also involves creating
better strategies for prevention. Indeed, relatively low-cost and nondrug based measures—like smoking cessation programs and
cervical cancer screening—are particularly important for mitigating
the burden of NCDs.90 Consider, for example, the many preventative
89

The corresponding high-income country share will fall from 26% of the
global total (or 75 million people, as opposed to the developing world’s 210
million) in 2010 to 21% (or 93 million people, as opposed to the developing
world’s 345 million) in 2030. Id.
90
Shanthi Mendis et al., Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases
(2014), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2014), at 5, http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/10665/148114/1/9789241564854_eng.pdf.
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interventions in the developed world that are built on generic drugs,
such as using aspirin as a means of preventing cardiovascular
illness.91 Here, the lack of patent protection on the relevant
therapeutic agent is hardly a starting point for discussion, much less
anything that we would generally envision as an omen of some
coming era devoid of medicines. In this respect, thinking about
preventative intervention, in the same way that cost of illness
accounting for NCD-related economic loss in the developing world
encourages us to, is already a first step toward unfastening the
straitjacket of the access-incentivization dilemma.
C. The Importance of the High Price of NCD Drugs
Notwithstanding the benefits of low-cost preventative
intervention, there is no doubt that the high prices for NCD drugs
are/will become a significant obstacle to better public health in the
developing world like the high prices for communicable disease
drugs have been.92 There are a number of reasons for this. First,
curative versus preventative measures cannot always be firmly
distinguished by the presence or absence of drugs as part of the
intervention design. As determined in the communicable disease
context by HIV/AIDS, there only needs to be a single or otherwise
small number of ailments that require costly drugs for their
prevention to make patent-inflated pricing a key issue in the success
of preventative intervention overall.93 Therefore, the high prices that
make it difficult even for developed world health agencies to
increase the availability of preventative therapies, like human
papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, are guaranteed to be more

91

Id. at 63.
In India, for example, 50% to 80% of expenditure for medical treatment is on
medicines. S. Srinivasan, ‘Medicines for All,’ The Pharma Industry and the Indian
State, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. (June 11–17, 2011).
93
Of course, HIV/AIDS drugs, unlike drugs for conditions like malaria, are the
one example among communicable disease medications that have robust markets
in the developed world. In this respect, they foreshadow why easing the
developing world’s access to NCD-drugs by moving away from strict approaches
to patent rights would not pose any meaningful threat to the multinational
pharmaceutical sector’s incentives.
92
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significant for low and middle-income countries because they will
not have access to them.94
Second, there is the fact that the burden of NCDs is mounting in
the developing world. As ailments like cancer and cardiovascular
disease grow in prevalence, so too will the demand for generally
higher priced drugs needed to treat them. Moreover, these drugs are
generally more likely to retain their status as higher priced because
it is these drugs that pharmaceutical firms have the strongest
interests in protecting behind patent walls—at least, evidently, if the
profits they profess to garner from consumer markets in highincome countries are to be believed.
Third, populations in the developed world are/will be living in
the same age of declining R&D spending as those in the developing
world. This is part and parcel of the increasing reliance by
multinationals on lucrative “me-too” drugs that redirect funds
toward marketing and advertising activities to differentiate such
products from their largely equivalent competitors.95 (From the
consumer standpoint, spending that remunerates marketing budgets
may be no more than a form of economic waste insofar as it leads
not to innovation but artificial product differentiation perpetuating
inflated prices for their own sake.96) Moreover, this tendency is
likely to prolong the period in which patents on NCD drugs—and
the inflated prices they allow—persist. To the extent that there is
increasing pressure to engage in so-called evergreening, the
significance that high prices for NCD drugs have on hindering

94

E.g., H.V. Hogerzeil et al., Promotion of Access to Essential Medicines for
Non-communicable Diseases: Practical Implications of the UN Political
Declaration, 381 THE LANCET 680, 684 (Feb. 12, 2013).
95
Arguments have been made that me-too drugs reduce consumer prices
through competition. For an effort to quantify the tradeoffs (reaching mixed
conclusions at best), see Stephane Régnier, What is the Value of ‘Me-Too’
Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE MGMT. SCI. 300 (Feb. 26, 2013).
96
For a still useful overview of different positions, see Peter Doyle, Economic
Aspects of Advertising: A Survey, 78 THE ECON. J. 570 (Sept. 1968). See also O.J.
FIRESTONE, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ADVERTISING (11th ed. 2013).
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public health in the developing world will become more, and not
less, intense.97
Finally, patent-inflated prices for NCD-drugs are/will become
more important because they impose additional costs on health care
systems that are rooted in the particular kind of innovation culture
they encourage. For example, patents are ill-suited for capturing the
social value created by preventative health interventions. This is
because the non-pharmaceutical based “information goods” that
such interventions either partly rely on or wholly consist of are
highly “non-excludable” in nature, thus making it difficult to patent
them.98 As a result, an innovation culture focused on patents will
tend to crowd out precisely those goods comprising the non-drug
based means of preventative intervention that are most likely to
compel a shift away from patent reliant/price-inflated
pharmaceutical goods in the first place. As suggested earlier, this is
particularly important in relation to NCDs given how much more
significant preventative intervention generally is in mitigating the
morbidity and mortality they cause.
V. THE ARGUMENT STRUCTURE OF NORMATIVE STALEMATE
Ultimately, the high prices that are made possible by the
monopolistic tendencies of patent protections on NCD drugs raise
two considerations pertinent to the argumentative structure of our
existing drugs-for-the-developing world debate. The first concern is
how the gains to multinationals from patented compounds should be
classified—whether as ordinary producer surpluses, excessive
supracompetitive profits,99 or outright confiscatory economic
97

See Ralf Boscheck, Intellectual Property Rights and the Evergreening of
Pharmaceuticals, 50 INTERECONOMICS 221 (July 2015). There is much
dissatisfaction with the term “evergreening.” However, it should not be mistaken
for clarity as to patent extension being of no importance. See Douglas L. Rogers,
Double Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition,
14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 317 (2017).
98
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–16 (2013).
99
“Supracompetitive profits” are generally understood as profits that are set at
a higher level than what could be obtained in a “normal” competitive market. For
a discussion in the legal context, see, for example, Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F.
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rents.100 The second deals with the extent to which these gains
needlessly come at the expense of consumer surpluses that
developing world inhabitants could otherwise recover through more
robust markets for generics and increasing competition.101
By equating the problem of public health in the developing
world with a crisis of infectious disease, these questions become
easier to elide. For most of the period during which upward
harmonization of national IP regime design has been the default in
international economic law, lost consumer surplus has been either
ignored or implicitly recast as a vanishing immediate-term cost. At
best, the suggestion goes, such losses are outweighed in the long run
by the benefits of financing the entry of new health-enhancing
compounds onto the market. On this view, patent power is finite,
and the near-term relationship between (confiscatory) producer and
(confiscated) consumer surpluses will reverse in time. Once the
patent ends, competition is projected to make the latter increase and
the former decrease, especially as the volume of total sales expands
as lower prices bring market expansion.102 However, as I argue
further below, such generalities provide even less guidance in the
NCD context than they have in the communicable disease context
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
100
See Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance,
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
67, 118 (2005) (explaining that pharmaceutical rents “come at a great cost to
society”); see also Anup Mialani, Reverse Settlements, Part 2: Drug Company
Profits, BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 26, 2013), https://blogs.harvard.edu/
billofhealth/2013/01/26/reverse-settlements-part-2-drug-company-profits/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2017) (describing that the amount spent by companies on R&D
correlates with the total expected rents from the patents they may obtain).
101
Outterson, supra note 100, at 72.
102
For further reading on this theory, see Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93 (2004). See also How
Patents Encourage Innovation in Technological Development and Deployment,
GLOB. GCS INST., https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/intellectualproperty-rights-role-patents-renewable-energy-technology-innovation/1-howpatents-encourage-innovation-technological-development-and-deployment;
PhRMA Statement on Patent Reform Act of 2009, PHRMA (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-patent-reform-act-of2009.
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as to how long we should tolerate the tradeoff,103 which is the crux
of the matter.104 Judged by this most crucial issue, measures making
IPR regimes stricter—as through standardizing twenty years as the
minimum period for protection105—seem arbitrary.
It is worth noting that focusing the artificiality of the normative
stalemate that the infectious disease perspective creates does not
eliminate the tension between access and incentivization. There are
obviously more traditional paths of normative argument—whether
on the grounds of ethics or neoclassical economic theory—that can
and have been made against strict approaches to patent rights.106 At
the same time, if this Part does not simply reproduce arguments
against a patent-based innovation system, it is for reasons other than
just avoiding reinventing existing wheels. It is thus crucial for
academics and policy makers to consider new exit strategies from
the long-standing circle of traditional pro- and con- positions on
103

E.g., Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent
Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials (Nat’l Bureau
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19430, 2013); Angus C. Chu, The Welfare
Cost of One-Size-Fits-All Patent Protection, 35 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL
876 (2011).
104
The question of “optimal” patent length defies generalization across
industries. Even in any given category the best approach to determining optimality
is elusive. See C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent, 38 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 839 (1956); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840 (1990); Andrew W. Horowitz & Edwin L.C. Lai, Patent
Length and the Rate of Innovation, 37 INT’L ECON. REV. 785 (1996); Meir Perez
Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, in
NEW HORIZONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29–31 (2004).
105
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 33.
106
The most prominent figure to do so is Nobel Prize-winning economist,
Joseph Stiglitz. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property
Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693 (2008); see also, e.g., Richard T. Rapp & Richard P.
Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75 (1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting
Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 20 HEALTH AFF. 119 (2001);
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer, & Jerry Avorn, Extensions of
Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on
Medicaid Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1637 (2006); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID
K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (1st ed. 2008).
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drug patents and public health. For doing so will not only help us
make sense of the new pattern of conflict in developing countries
around drug patents, but it will also help prevent the increasing level
of debate about drug prices in the developed world from, itself,
counterproductively becoming trapped in the same circle.
A. Normative Arguments For and Against Patent Rights
As conventionally understood, the rationales for patent rights are
two-fold. One broad category of theories emphasizes the role of
intellectual property as a means for rewarding creativity (taking into
account both the labor and investment to create) that is considered
as a good inherently worthy of reward.107 While ostensibly freestanding, such views are difficult to separate from the second broad
category of consequentialist justifications for patent rights that focus
on the need to reward creativity (and the labor and investment going
into it) in order to encourage technological innovation108 and,
thereby, the proliferation of the wider social good it engenders.109
Insofar as the latter class of consequentialist bases for a strict
approach to patent regime design is more specifically welfarist in
nature,110 the idea of the proliferating social good to which the
incentivization of creativity is linked further permits justification to
be articulated through the idiom of conventional economic theory.
From the microeconomic standpoint, this entails emphasizing the
107

ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17–18 (1st ed.
2011).
108
This is the case either if creativity is understood to be inherently reward
worthy on “Kantian” lines (which tend to blur the deontological bases of property
rights with a consequentialist one) or if deontology and consequentialism are,
themselves, understood to be indistinct. For the equivocal nature of Kant’s moral
theory, see DAVID CUMMISKEY, KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM (1996). On the
inherent equivocality of the deontology/consequentialism distinction—albeit, in
the context, of specifically “utilitarian” versions of consequentialism, and “rule”
versus “act” versions of utilitarianism, see Gerald F. Gaus, What is Deontology?
Part One: Orthodox Views, 35 J. VALUE INQUIRY 27, 28–29 (2001).
109
For a more typical example of blurring these two bases of justification, see
Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law
and Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011).
110
Of course, not all consequentialism is welfarist. See William W. Fisher &
Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing
World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 637 n.135, 638 n.140 (2006–2007).
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possibility of a net welfare gain from erecting legal barriers to entry
into a market by a firm’s competitors. On this view, there is a longterm culture of innovation that can be expected to follow from
assuring inventors an increased income that would otherwise be
stymied by the free ridership of non-innovators on the ingenuity of
others.111 The overall benefit of mitigating the risks of R&D through
patents is thus seen to outweigh the short-term cost (in lost consumer
surplus) that may result from granting their holders exclusive
rights.112 In the context of international economic relations, much of
the same reasoning is typically used to argue for the upward
harmonization of country-level IPR standards, even despite the
tendency for strict patent regimes to concentrate innovation in the
developing world. The implicit assumption, in other words, is that
longer-term economic welfare effects will eventually trickle down
to the residents of the developing world.113
From the macroeconomic perspective, patent rights acquire a
further significance when explaining economic growth. In this
regard, patents are often thought to be significant because they help
to sustain positive marginal returns to capital that create the
additional positive spillovers (especially in a knowledge-based
economy by furthering innovation, technology’s learning-by-doing
effects, and so on) necessary for growth, according to some
economists.114 This is because, unlike in the first wave of
neoclassical growth theories of the kind pioneered by Robert
Solow,115 in so-called endogenous growth theory, technological
111
RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 179–81 (2013); Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 108–09 (1990).
112
See NORDHAUS, supra note 104.
113
FRANK MÜLLER-LANGER, GABLER, CREATING R&D INCENTIVES FOR
MEDICINES FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 99–100 (2009).
114
Bart Verspagen, Intellectual Property Rights in the World Economy, in
ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 489–518 (Ove Granstrand ed.,
2003).
115
Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, THE Q. J.
OF ECON. 65, 70 (1956); Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957). For a recent
restatement, see DARON ACEMOGLU, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 56–
69 (2008).
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change is seen as more than just haphazard or accidental.116 Instead,
endogenous growth theorists envision technological change
(including the type that one can argue is incentivized by patent
rights) through investment in research and development to be part
and parcel of economizing behavior itself as firms seek to overcome
the effects of otherwise diminishing returns on their capital.
Accordingly, insofar as a strong patent rights regime can be said to
help facilitate technological change through driving R&D
investment, it becomes a prerequisite to growth in its own right.117
While the above synopsis summarizes the main points of
conventional economic theory’s reformulation of the
consequentialist basis for patent rights, it is not exhaustive. Besides
the possibility that deadweight losses from the monopolistic
tendencies118 in pricing will be outweighed by the boon of a culture
of innovation, others sometimes quote lesser economic reasons
favoring strict patent rights. Especially in the pharmaceutical
context, the effects of forcing information disclosure through the
patent filing process can also produce benefits that redound to the
economy more generally.119 Some see the positive spillovers of
technological innovation as necessary prerequisites to growth, while
others emphasize that patents rationalize the process by which
sequential innovations accumulate. Through setting the bargaining
positions under which cooperation between first innovators and

116
For the canonical early formation, see Paul Romer, Endogenous
Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. 71 (1990). For a broader discussion of
subsequent contributions by Romer and others, see GEORGE KORRES, TECHNICAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INSIDE THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY
41–50 (2d ed. 2008).
117
Verspagen, supra note 114, at 492–93.
118
For a (purportedly) skeptical view about patents-as-outright monopolies, see
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000).
119
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273,
278–79 (1998); see also STAFF OF COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., STUDY
OF THE S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS (Comm. Print
1985).
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those seeking to harness the positive externalities of their work
proceeds, patents are thus said to promote additional efficiencies.120
It is not easy to square such potential advantages with the evident
failure of the patent system in the context of infectious diseases. If
it was, then the drugs-for-the-developing world controversy would
not have gained as much attention.121 Indeed, as William Fisher and
Talha Syed note, the most apparent marks of this failure correspond
less to a tradeoff between access and incentivization, and more to a
failure to deliver either.122
First, some of the most effective existing therapies for treating
infectious diseases are insulated by patent protection. This allows
patent holders to price these therapies at a cost that the world’s poor
are not able to afford. Second, the new therapies that are greatly
needed for treating these same infectious diseases are few and far
between. As discussed earlier, firms are more focused on creating
drugs that are functionally similar to lucrative equivalents already
on the market or instead focused on creating new drugs for treating
diseases that are most prevalent in high-income countries that
generate more revenue.123 Therefore, with regard to drugs for
neglected diseases in low and middle-income countries, the market
has proven incapable. There is no coordinating a proper overlap
between the willingness (due to the underlying inability) of the
afflicted to pay for existing therapies and the prices at which drug
makers are allowed to set their willingness to accept payment. In
turn, the market has been incapable of generating new therapies for
infectious diseases that are already undersupplied.
We can further restate both halves of this two-sided failure for
treating infectious diseases in terms of conventional economic
theory. In the language of information economics, the failure to
broaden access to communicable disease drugs corresponds to what
Stiglitz calls the “static inefficiency” that IPRs create.124 Strict patent
120
Suzanne Schotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
121
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 8, 48, and 57.
122
Fisher & Syed, supra note 110, at 583.
123
Id.
124
Stiglitz, supra note 106.
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rights exclude end users or competitors from capturing the
additional utility value that their increased consumption of
(medicinal) goods would otherwise make possible. This is because
the main input to such goods is knowledge, the use of which carries
no marginal cost. If consumers were permitted to consume more
knowledge-based goods, or, if competitors to the patent holder were
able to consume more knowledge for production, then more welfare
would materialize. Accordingly, with knowledge-based goods, there
is no a priori reason to think increasing output will lead to rising
costs and increases in consumer prices. Indeed, there also is ample
reason to think they would actually decrease due to more robust
competition and market expansion.125
The apparent failure of IPR-inflated pricing to deliver
innovation in the infectious disease drug context corresponds to
what Stiglitz calls the problem of the “dynamic costs.”126 Even under
the best-case scenario, as Stiglitz emphasizes, where patents do
reward (and thus encourage) innovation, there is a fundamental
disparity between marginal private and social returns. That is, the
marginal social return from patents (when they do actually
encourage innovation) lies in how they bring about innovation
earlier than it otherwise would have materialized. Due to the scale
and complexity of the research, especially for producing high
technology goods, the innovation usually results from multiple
research groups converging on the same breakthrough. The regular
course of events, in other words, is clearly not the occurrence of
some act of singular genius making the breakthrough.
Innovation instead usually takes place within, or based on,
underlying foundational research, made possible by public funding
or the public sector,127 and is a matter of when and not if. However,
patent-based innovation systems reward whoever gets there first in
a way that fails to proportionally account for the benefit that newer
125

Id. at 1700.
The “dynamic costs” making for a negative of patents in Stiglitz’s eyes
should be distinguished from his allusions to “dynamic incentives”—that is,
incentivization—as a justification for patents. Compare id. at 1704, with id. at
1706.
127
See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013).
126
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versions of the innovation will confer on society. That is, the patent
system does not reward innovators based on the increment of social
return resulting from innovation being brought to market earlier than
it otherwise would have been; rather, it rewards the recipient of the
right with a windfall gain comprising the entire value of the
innovation.128 Even if the pharmaceutical sector was providing a
steady supply of new infectious disease drugs, patent protections on
such hypothetical innovations would involve dynamic inefficiencies
that could easily outweigh their apparent benefits.
B. The Failure of the Market versus Market Failure
The existing innovation system has demonstrated a notable
inability to facilitate either the emergence of new communicable
disease drugs or a widening of the availability of existing ones in the
developing world. As a result, this would seem to give us good
reason to hesitate before transposing the abstract dichotomy
between access and incentivization (and the theoretical dilemma it
portends) onto the NCD context. Mitigating against such hesitance,
however, is the way that a failure to deliver either communicable
disease drug access or incentivization can be detached from the
problem of market failure—and certainly so as to deemphasize IPRs
as its cause. “Market failure,” in the technical sense, is the
consequence of several underlying problems, such as imperfect
information, preference structures that are mismatched in time,
externalities, non-competitive markets, and public goods. Market
failure is not a product of a failure to create equitable or otherwise
ethically desirable results, but only of ones that fail to be “efficient”
(whether on the more exacting standard of Pareto efficiency or some
less exacting one like the Kaldor-Hicks variety).129
As suggested earlier, the misalignment between consumers and
producers of communicable disease drugs does result from a noncompetitive market and one that is substantially dictated by patents.
The infectious disease drug market is thus characterized by goods
128

Stiglitz, supra note 106, at 1706–07.
For a brief summary of these oft-discussed concepts, see Ken CooperStephenson & Elaine Gibson, Economic Analysis Substantive Inequality and Tort
Law, in TORT THEORY 137 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds.,
1993).
129
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with sale prices that do not correspond to their marginal cost of
production. However, within the existing drugs-for-the-developing
world debate, the implicit tendency has been to stop well short of
casting such market imperfection as the cause of market failure.
Instead, it becomes the consequence of rationally balancing one
source of potential market failure with another that is particularly
liable to affect pharmaceuticals as knowledge-based public goods.
Accordingly, a familiar train of suggestions ensues. Because
there is no marginal cost associated with their key input of
knowledge, public goods such as pharmaceuticals ordinarily would
result in the greatest efficiency by being distributed for one and all
to use freely.130 However, this fails to account for the need to use
past discoveries to generate new knowledge. As a result, the
corrosive effects of free ridership are seen as a much greater concern
for pharmaceuticals than for other knowledge-based public goods
(which have actual or ostensible zero-marginal costs of use). Rather
than two failed goals of the patent system (in the communicable
disease drug context), access and incentivization instead end up as
two poles of a seemingly imminent and zero-sum tradeoff.
Paradoxically, the concept of market failure ends up adding to
rather than taking away from the case for strict IP regime design.
This is especially so when we consider that law and policy concepts
are deployed not only in specialist literature, but also more
importantly as part of ordinary language sound bites in the public
sphere. In terms of its rhetorical structure, the existing drugs-forthe-developing world debate has meant no sooner is the question of
market failure raised than it is made to recede. In its place, the key
question instead becomes one stated in terms of how we should trade
off aims that are ostensibly different in kind: whether of the shortversus long-term, the “ethical” versus the “economic,” or, in
cannibalizing Stiglitz’s critique of strong IPR, the “static
inefficiencies” of patents versus their “dynamic incentives.”131
130

Stiglitz, supra note 106, at 1700.
See generally Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002); James Huebner, Moral
Psychology and the Intuition that Pharmaceutical Companies Have a ‘Special’
Obligation to Society, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 501 (2014); Sara Parker-Lue, Michael
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Even when the existing infectious disease drug market is
imagined to reinstate the supposedly acute normative dilemma
between access and incentivization, all of the same objections
remain that lean against strong IPR. It is thus not clear that drug
patents have been successful in promoting innovation, despite the
fact that pharmaceuticals are often said to be one of the best
examples of strong IPR at work.132 Additionally, what innovation
does occur in drug development is financed largely through public
funding, especially for the foundational research on which the
products of privatized end-stage invention are parasitic.133 Then
there also remains the issue of how the revenues that are generated
by allowing producers to sell patented compounds above their
marginal costs are actually used. As noted earlier, rather than for the
purposes of financing R&D, these funds are now routinely and
increasingly apportioned to ever-expanding budgets that firms
devote to marketing and advertising.134
Santoro & Greg Koski, The Ethics and Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing, 55
ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 191 (2015); The New Drugs War,
THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 4, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21592619-patents-drugs-are-interests-sick-well-industry-protectionshould-not.
132
For the case favoring the innovation-promoting effects of drug patents, see
Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002). For the skeptical view, see MARCIA ANGELL, THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES (1st ed. 2004); Michael Boldrin & David
Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013); Carlos Maria
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Regardless of these objections, in the absence of any a priori
way of definitively calculating how to make the relevant tradeoff,
the familiar metaphor of balancing implies that the difficulty of the
choice lies in sacrificing present “do-gooding” for a more soberminded view of the future. On this view, a strict IP regime becomes
the lesser of two evils because it ultimately preserves the ongoing
existence of the market and the progress it is purported to have made
possible in the first place. Paradoxically, the more extreme the
failure of the market in ensuring pharmaceutical access and
incentivization in the infectious disease drug context is, the less
strictly is the approach to patents because of the problem of market
failure, in the technical sense of economic theory. On the contrary,
the more extreme the market’s failure has been, the more
government interference with private rights has been seen as the real
problem. Ultimately, strict approaches to patent rights and the
upward harmonization of national IP regime design becomes
presumptuously market-strengthening, notwithstanding the way it
openly undermines competitive market structures.
By assuming that the developing world is plagued by
communicable disease alone, an inverse proportionality is created
between the perceived relevance of the technical problem of market
failure and that of the market’s practical failure to elicit either
pharmaceutical access or incentivization. Indeed, the very existence
of this inverse proportionality further heightens the sense that the
real problem is forgoing “ethics” for “economics.” In other words,
once the upward harmonization of national IP regime design is seen
to result from a necessary tradeoff between accepting imperfection
in the competitive structure of the market in the present and avoiding
greater market disruption due to the problem of public goods in the
future, the economics of market failure is even more clearly
absolved of relevance. In turn, the purported fact that the majority
of the developing world’s inhabitants are simply outside the market
creates greater concern. This is because these inhabitants are viewed
less as consumers whose demand the market has failed to equilibrate
Jayadev, Medicines for Tomorrow: Some Alternative Proposals to Promote
Socially Beneficial Research and Development in Pharmaceuticals, 7 J. GENERIC
MED. 217, 219 (2010).
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with the corresponding supply than they are as a class of needy or
(potentially) afflicted. Therefore, the dichotomy between economics
and ethics ends up being entrenched. Increasing pharmaceutical
access depends, at best, only on a stance rooted in a morality of
deontic empathy or utilitarian prudence—and not any justifiable
compunction born from economics’ higher rationality.
Needless to say, there are many problems with distinctly
separating the economic dimension from the ethical dimension of
strict approaches to patents and the upward harmonization of
national IPR regime design. First and foremost, it reifies the
market.135 To categorically distinguish the two thus ends up
naturalizing one highly contingent way in which to arrange certain
aspects of the market’s institutional design; namely, that which
follows from strict approaches to IPR. Whether seen as necessary or
counterproductive—by
their
supporters
and
detractors,
respectively—alternative institutional arrangements appear as if
they can follow only from imposing outside logics onto the design
of the rule regime that economics would otherwise clearly mandate.
To dichotomize the logics that factor into questions about national
IP regime design also then exacerbates the tendency for the drugsfor-the-developing world debate to become a proxy for the larger
debate on free trade to which it need not be related at all. For that
debate, too, has been rhetorically premised on a categorical
distinction between the “economic” and the “ethical” issues raised
by globalization. In turn, departures from strict IPR frameworks of
the kind that have been pushed through free trade agreements in the
post-Cold War come to be reflexively delegitimized as examples of
protectionist antipathy to a true ethos of market freedom.
C. Re-Contextualizing the Access-Incentivization Dilemma in Light
of the Crisis/Economics of NCDs
The circumstances that bring together those who produce drugs
for infectious diseases and those who need these drugs have thus
been made to seem extremely fragile. On the one hand, there is a
market within which consumers are so devoid of purchasing power
135
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that they make, in effect, for no market at all. With such individuals
becoming more so a collection of the needy than any aggregate
source of demand, their predicament attenuates any sense that the
real problem is one of market failure. On the other hand, there is no
significant class of persons afflicted by “third world” ailments in
rich countries. Consequently, even notwithstanding the obvious and
often severe economic stratifications within high-income countries,
low and middle-income countries are the only market for such drugs.
In the end, it becomes more implausible to regard the developing
world as a realm in which companies should be expected to function
out of the goodness of their hearts.
As different as these two circumstances may appear on the
surface, however, underneath they evoke a surprisingly resilient
figure of the multinational pharmaceutical firm. This is because the
multinational is portrayed as being squeezed on all sides. On one
side, it is threatened by the public’s perception that the firms profit
off of the sick and dying bodies of the poor. On the other side, it
faces the hard facts that there is little reason to manufacture—let
alone research and develop alternatives for—the types of drugs
needed for those in low and middle-income countries. The portrait
of the pharmaceutical industry as a victim besieged on all sides
effectively suggests that the prices for infectious disease drugs,
absent patents, would have to be entirely non-remunerative. In turn,
any denial of the firm’s ability to avail itself of patent protections
ends up becoming the real interference with the market, and also one
that is both insensible and unfair.
The sophisticated observer may well know that there are more
specific empirical considerations upon which the veracity of these
suggestions—leading back to an intractable access-incentivization
dilemma—actually depends. Yet in the public sphere, the recurrent
starting point for the drugs-for-the-developing world debate is the
multinational pharmaceutical firm, which is seen as the inheritor of
an impossible role. On the one hand, the firm is seen as being left to
stand watch over the economic incentives necessary to make drug
development possible. On the other, it is then scorned for ethical
villainy. Not surprisingly, we consequently often hear about the
widely quoted, but much less interrogated, price tag of $800
million—or, since the latest update, now $2.6 billion—that the
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development of a single new compound is purported to cost.136 Even
within economically fluent legal literature, there is a substantial
tendency to start from the same kinds of observation—this is partly
because of the highly porous boundary between specialist
scholarship and the discourse of the public sphere.
Against such a backdrop, it is unsurprising that the means for
making essential medicines for infectious diseases more readily
available in the developing world are typically framed as exceptions
to a default of strict patent rights. Such potential exceptions include
mandatory licensing agreements; segmented markets through tiered
pricing; lower retail prices through parallel importation;
government-declared national and public health emergency as a
basis for licensing; so-called true equity pricing; and more robust
competition through assorted ways of building up the generic drug
industries.137
Often discussed in the WTO context as so-called TRIPSflexibilities, these measures have not all been equally accepted,
much less operationalized. Even so, characterizing them as
exceptions from a norm of strict IPR rather than paths to a different
norm altogether has always been due to the constraints of political
reality as much as logical necessity. For example, the need for
national emergency licenses is bound to seem exceptional only if it
is imaginatively surrounded by the assumption of an ostensibly noncontext dependent zero-sum tradeoff, demanding that we prioritize
hypothetical incentivization over access. Yet once we begin to
reckon with the normative aims of access and incentivization from
the standpoint of the developing world’s NCD crisis, national
emergency licensing just as well may exemplify the arbitrary nature
of treating upward harmonization of national IP regime design as
the preferred norm. This is because unlike with communicable
diseases, the global burden of which are concentrated in areas with
the economically least remunerative markets, NCDs and the cost136

See DiMasi, supra note 8.
Dianne Nicol & Olasupo Owoeye, Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate
Access to Medicines, 91 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
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amortizing supracompetitive profits they provide from developed
world markets are distributed more evenly across all country groups.
If the crucial importance of this fact has not been at the forefront
of academic and policy debate in the developed world, there is little
doubt about its becoming so in the developing world. Indeed, the
new pattern of conflict over drug patents and the TRIPS that has
emerged since 2010testifies to that. As the global share of NCD
burden absorbed by developing countries increases, controversies
over patents will increasingly call the theoretical good sense of
upward harmonization/strict IPR itself into question. This is a matter
the article returns to in the new pattern of conflict it documents
between developing countries and multinational pharmaceutical
firms in Part VI.
Even if the marketization of low and middle-income country
demand for NCD drugs becomes constrained in the future, existing
levels of cost-amortizing supracompetitive profits should remain
intact. It is important to remember that current returns are evidently
more than sufficient to sustain the high levels of profitability the
multinational pharmaceutical sector reports.138 Nor is there any
reason to expect that firms will suddenly siphon existing returns in
order to escalate the subsidy they provide to R&D for new infectious
disease drugs.
To say only this much is to misstate the present state of affairs.
Rather than remaining at a standstill, multinationals will commodify
at least part of the growing number of developing world inhabitants
who will be afflicted with “rich country” diseases in the years to
come. Dominant firms will thus be positioned to capture a new and
distinct source of expanding profits as the well-off in the developing
world increasingly consume not only more animal protein and
automobiles, but also more therapies for the illnesses that such
138

See, e.g., Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat
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lifestyles bring. Even supposing that firms reap no additional profits
from such novel revenue sources, there is still no reason to expect
any drastic worsening in the highly lucrative status quo that the
multinational pharmaceutical sector presently enjoys. If anything, it
is only reasonable to expect the opposite given that the NCD crisis
will expand and bring new market opportunities not only in the
developing world but also in the developed world itself.
What if the multinational pharmaceutical sector ends up facing
the even more unlikely eventuality of having to sell NCD drugs to
developing world consumers only at marginal cost? There is still
little reason to expect any deterioration of the existing situation of
windfall profits—assuming that high-income country markets
remained quarantined from arbitrage opportunities.139 Suffice to say,
the industry would hardly fail to mobilize its political power at home
to maintain (and expand) legal restrictions that already largely
disbar intermediaries from importing developing country versions
of drugs back into their home markets.140 Indeed, even if this extreme
unlikelihood came to fruition, it would lead to a deterioration in the
industry’s bottom line only if arbitrage pushed the original
supplier’s ability to sell in the home market down to the same
minimum. However, this defies both logic and existing reality.
Ultimately, a future in which being forced to sell only at marginal
cost in the developing world leads to the pharmaceutical sector’s
current levels of high profitability deteriorating—or even staying the
same—rather than expanding with the growing global NCD crisis is
highly unlikely.
The various qualifications outlined above are especially worth
noting as we turn to the most careful of existing attempts to reckon
with the access-incentivization dilemma in light of the developing
world’s emerging NCD crisis. In his article on the topic, Keith
Outterson distinguishes “neglected diseases” of the kind most
readily associated with health crisis in low and middle-income
139
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countries from what he calls “global diseases.”141 Because global
diseases affect rich and poor-country inhabitants alike, but the poor
disproportionately, Outterson advocates that these conditions should
be addressed through a system of what he calls “patent buy-outs.”142
Under such a system, only inhabitants of high-income countries
would bear the cost of pharmaceutical patent rents.143 All patented
drugs would then be offered to the other 84% of the world’s
population at generic prices.144 This, Outterson argues, would create
widespread public health gains by making medicines for all diseases
more affordable in the developing world. At the same time, it would
bring only a very slight decrease in global research and development
cost recovery: as he notes, the more than 80% of patent-based cash
flow undergirding such spending that now comes from sales within
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries would remain untouched.145 Indeed, it is in order to make
up for even this slight deficit in the funds available for R&D
spending that Outterson proposes the mechanism of patent buy-outs
in the first place.146 Accordingly, its explicit purpose is to “[restore]
to the companies” lost revenues from the inability to sell above
marginal cost in developing world markets.147
Outterson’s thoughtful proposal is notable for a number of
reasons. Most of all, he is one of the few who have sought to address
the drugs-for-the-developing world debate on a comprehensive
basis by asking how to address both communicable and noncommunicable diseases. At the same time, the proposal is notable
because it is premised on the assumption that even a minimal
departure from the status quo guaranteeing high profits to
141
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pharmaceutical multinationals would be unacceptable. This is
implicit in the very idea of a buy-out mechanism that seeks to restore
existing rents rather than some other negative, zero, or otherwise
more constrained positive value above the margin.
In this respect, one might say that what the proposal purports to
give with one hand in terms of practical feasibility for addressing
the ill effects of the patent system it takes away with the other. For
it would still leave intact the normative stalemate that has emerged
from the past two decades of debate based on the implicit context of
a developing world plagued by non-remunerative “third world”
diseases alone. Indeed, we can further illuminate this point by
considering the practical complications that would surely await any
patent buy-out mechanism of Outterson’s kind.
Chief among these is the dual complication of (1) over-including
developing world elites—who would otherwise be able to pay full
prices—within the system of generic cost provisioning and (2)
under-including those in the developed world who could not.148 For
his own part, Outterson does acknowledge that over-inclusion —
especially of the millions who purportedly rank among the middle
classes in places like China, India, and Brazil—would be
particularly likely to attract opposition. However, the proposal
underplays this admission by too hastily imagining that the
inclusivity problem would find its own solution.149 Thus, on the one
hand, Outterson suggests that under-inclusion could fix itself
directly, given the very purpose of the buy-out mechanism.150 That
is, the mechanism would naturally require larger transfers to
pharmaceutical firms as the magnitude of lost rents increased. On
the other hand, he suggests that under-inclusion might instead fix
itself indirectly. In this case, the problem would prompt
pharmaceutical companies to more vociferously pursue tiered
pricing in developing country markets through brand campaigns and
new restrictions on arbitrage.151
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Believing in the likelihood of such self-executing solutions,
however, portrays an attitude that is too sanguine about the ease with
which under-inclusion would abate. Even a buy-out mechanism
designed to keep the magnitude of existing returns to the
multinational pharmaceutical sector untouched would thus hardly be
any more practically feasible than whatever other solutions we
might imagine. There are at least five more specific reasons why this
is so.
The first concerns the mechanism leading to the indirect fix for
under-inclusion. For that mechanism could just as easily undermine
the efficacy of the buy-out system overall. Building momentum for
market segmentation to enable higher price tiers that could more
easily make up for lost rents thus seems to be at sharp odds with
fostering a market ethos receptive to making generics available at
marginal cost. Likewise, insofar as the same momentum would lead
to more intensive restrictions on arbitrage, its logic would again
work against facilitating a culture of availability at marginal cost.
Second, it is unclear why firms would accept recovery of lost
rents from the elite stratum of developing world inhabitants alone.
A highly contentious round of bargaining seems just as likely, and
it is easy to imagine that it would aim for a costlier system based on
a gradation of proportional buy-outs for what firms would argue
were foregone revenues from additional down-market segments of
developing world consumers. Given the visibility of their middle
classes, Brazil, India, and China would become major flashpoints
and possibly derail the whole buy-out system. This is especially
because the proposal already assumes that special arrangements
would be needed for these same countries to foot the bill for the buyouts directly from their own national budgets. If we cannot
practically expect the United States, European Union, or the United
Nations to finance buying out lost rents from these countries, why
should we imagine that the pharmaceutical sector would be content
losing more rather than less of those rents?152 Of course, this is
assuming that getting countries like Brazil, India, and China to buy
out even just the equivalent of rents from their middle classes would
be possible in the first place.
152
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Third, and even more troubling, the sizes of the developing
world’s middle classes are difficult to estimate with certainty. This
is compounded by the fact that, at least in conventional discussion,
those classes are assumed to be rapidly increasing. If this was so, the
multinational pharmaceutical sector would have even (more) reason
to support a buy-out system of any kind. After all, the alternative
would be a status quo in which firms could continue extracting at
least their current rents from developing world markets directly.
Especially with an expanding pool of such rents to anticipate, is a
buy-out system really a more feasible solution than moving away
from a norm of strict patent rights altogether?
Fourth, and related, is the following question: if support for a
buy-out mechanism (to incentivize ongoing R&D) is less likely than
the proposal makes it seem, and if the patent system is as detrimental
to access as the proposal assumes, what confidence can we have in
the political reality it is built upon? This fourth problem is closely
related to the fifth and last problem.
This last problem is, namely, that it seems that actual events in
the developing world are already reconstituting the sense of what is
politically feasible. In this respect, the horizon of possibility seems
to be moving in a very different direction from that which the patent
buy-out mechanism assumes, as developing countries shift toward
strategically contesting patents for NCD drugs. This pattern of
conflict obviously cannot be completely divorced from the long
history of controversy around various infectious disease drugs going
back to the late 1990s.153 However, even as it builds on what came
before, there is clearly a departure.

VI. BREAKING WITH STRICT PATENT RIGHTS ON NCD DRUGS
As the Gleevec controversy in India suggested, well before the
current rise of skepticism about free trade liberalization, there has
emerged a renewed push for questioning strict IPR in the developing
world. This push back against strict IPR, however, has come largely
from civil society, heterodox economics, health equity, and
153
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responsible government perspectives rather than from party politics.
In both theory and fact, it thus adds to the reasons why the crisis of
NCDs is becoming the key issue that should encourage
policymakers to assess the rules governing our global innovation
system moving forward.
While in the last half-decade developing countries have used
many strategies to contest patents on NCDs—and, by extension, the
architecture of TRIPS-based IPR regime design—it is beyond the
scope of this paper to describe them all. Instead, in this section, an
illustrative approach to two main types of contest is discussed.
Continuing the discussion of the Novartis decision in India, the first
involves further examples of developing countries that are
effectively heightening the bar for patentability in the face of
modifications to existing compounds.154 The second involves
contests over NCD drugs rooted in the crucial mechanism for
breaking with strict patent rights known as compulsory licensing.155
A. Measures Heightening the Bar for Patentability (of
Modifications)
1. India and Tykerb
Soon after the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in the Gleevec
case, India’s IPAB revoked the patent on another prominent cancer
drug known as lapatinib ditosylate. Sold by GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK) under the name Tykerb, the drug is another tyrosine kinase
inhibitor.156 It was initially approved for use in the U.S. in 2007.157
In June 2008, the Kolkata office of the Controller of Patents
issued GSK two patents, one for lapatinib and one for its ditosylate
salt.158 Five years later, shortly after the Gleevec case was resolved,
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in 2013 the IPAB issued two distinct decisions on the Tykerb
controversy. Lapatinib itself was deemed non-obvious and thus a
true qualifying invention protected from competition until 2019.159
However, the IPAB revoked the patent for the salt form of the drug
on two grounds. First, it held that GSK failed to meet the statutory
requirement for non-obviousness under the Patents Act. Second, it
found that GSK’s application fell afoul of Section 3(d).160 With the
Novartis decision still fresh, the Section 3(d) rejection was solely
because the IPAB revoked GSK’s patent. As the IPAB declared, it
“need not examine any further” claims made by the petitioner, but
would address the “obviousness . . . issue since . . . [it was]
important.”161 With the Tykerb controversy, it is not by accident that
the Novartis decision’s approach to defining Section 3(d)’s
heightened standard of patentability for modifications was cemented
in the context of another prominent NCD drug.162
2. India and Abraxane
The third prominent recent case involving a heightened bar
of patentability for NCD therapies in India involved another cancer
drug named paclitaxel, a mitotic inhibitor. Paclitaxel was approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the early 1990s to
treat breast and ovarian cancers.163 Over the years, it has grown to
include treatment for lung and pancreatic cancer as well.164
Paclitaxel was originally commercialized by Bristol-Myers
Squibb under the brand name Taxol.165 Subsequently, the
biotechnology company Abraxis BioScience (later acquired by
Celgene), modified the drug by binding it to the protein albumin.166
This allows the drug to be administered intravenously in injectable
159
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form. The albumin-bound modified version was called Abraxane,
and Abraxis Bioscience filed for a patent on it in India in 2005.167 In
2009, India’s Patent Office heard a motion for pre-grant opposition
from the generics manufacturer Natco Pharma, claiming that
Abraxane lacked an inventive step.168 Concurring with Natco’s
assertions, the IPO’s Assistant Controller rejected Abraxis
BioScience’s application on Section 3(d) grounds.169 In so doing, it
cited the applicant’s inability to show that the albumin-bound form
of paclitaxel had enhanced efficacy, understood to mean therapeutic
efficacy as outlined in the Novartis decision.170 On appeal to the
IPAB, the original decision was remanded back to the IPO to be
considered anew.171 At the same time, Natco issued updated claims
in opposition.172 In June 2014, the Indian Patent Office rejected
Abraxane’s patent application once more.173
3. India and Januvia
We now turn to a controversy surrounding diabetic drugs in
India. While still not fully settled, a major battle has been ongoing
over Merck’s Januvia, a widely-used type-2 diabetes medicine.
Januvia is the phosphate salt form of sitagliptin, a compound that
increases insulin levels in the body, thereby lowering blood
glucose.174 Januvia was approved in the U.S. by the FDA in 2006,
and by 2007, modified preparations appeared on the market, most
notably Janumet.175 In creating Janumet, Merck combined Januvia
with another diabetic drug called metformin, which was already a
generic drug in the U.S.176 This combination provided patients with
167
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one pill (Janumet) containing two diabetes drugs (Januvia as the
modified salt form of sitagliptin and metformin).177
Merck had originally secured patents on sitagliptin in India in
2007.178 However, after applying for new protections for Januvia
(the modified phosphate salt form of sitagliptin), the IPO rejected
granting Merck additional rights upon hearing a motion for pregrant opposition brought by the Indian company Glenmark
Pharmaceuticals.179
After the IPO’s ruling in April of 2013, Glenmark then released
generic versions of both Januvia and Janumet under the names Zita
and Zitamet, respectively.180 Merck immediately filed suit in the
Delhi High Court, requesting an interim injunction to restrain
Glenmark from infringing on its patents.181 In defense of its actions,
Glenmark argued that it was not infringing on Merck’s original
sitagliptin patent.182 Rather, Glenmark argued that Zita and Zitamet
were generic versions of the distinct but unpatented entity
comprised of sitagliptin’s phosphate salt (Januvia and Janumet).183
Glenmark thus claimed that there was no protected entity that Zita
or Zitamet could be infringing upon.184 In response, Merck argued
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See Rupali Mukherjeel, Patent War Over Drugs Goes Chronic, TIMES OF
INDIA (Apr. 1, 2013, 4:28 AM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
/business/india-business/Patent-war-over-drugs-goes-chronic/articleshow/
19315419.cms.
181
For the initial decision of the Delhi High Court, see Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.
v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Unreported Judgments 2015 (Del.) (India),
http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/AKP/judgement/07-10-2015/AKP07102015S5862013.pdf.
182
Id. at paras. 8–9.
183
Id.
184
Id. at para. 10.

DEC. 2017]

IP and Non-Communicable Disease

231

that its phosphate salt was not an entity distinct from sitagliptin.185
Merck even went so far as to use Section 3(d) of the Patents Act to
claim the phosphate salt form of sitagliptin was nothing more than a
derivative.186
The Delhi High Court ultimately denied Merck’s request for an
interim injunction, largely endorsing Glenmark’s reasoning.187
However, on appeal in March 2015, the decision was reversed.188
While the ultimate outcome of the Januvia controversy waits to be
determined,189 the proceedings to date illustrate that conflict over
Section 3(d) is not limited to cancer drugs. For example, a similar
controversy is currently raging between various Indian generics
companies and Novartis over Vildagliptin, another diabetic drug.190
The Januvia conflict in India once more illustrates the way in
which Section 3(d) has become entangled within its broader IP
regime. It was thus Section 3(d) that became the IPO’s basis for
denying Merck a patent on the phosphate salt of sitagliptin.191
185

Id. at para. 12.
Id. at para. 13.
187
See id. at para. 26. Drawing on the Novartis decision, the Court turned its
Section 3(d) implications on their heads, arguing that it was up to Merck to show
that the phosphate form of sitagliptin was indistinct from the non-phosphate form
and failed to enhance therapeutic efficacy. See id. at para. 74.
188
See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Unreported
Judgments 2015 (Del.) (India), http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/SRB/judgement/06-072015/SRB20032015FAOOS1902013.pdf.
189
See Shreeja Sen, SC Stays Delhi HC Order Restraining Glenmark from
Making Anti-Diabetes Drug, LIVEMINT (Mar. 25, 2015, 3:06 PM),
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/H0TjAmE0SMQaQQ3lEqfebP/SC-staysDelhi-HC-order-restraining-Glenmark-from-making-ant.html. Only two days
after the Delhi High Court’s appeal decision, its grant of interim injunction against
Glenmark was staid by India’s Supreme Court. Id.
190
Apoorva, Court Grants Novartis Temporary Injunction Against Ranbaxy,
LIVEMINT (Sept. 9, 2014, 12:55 AM), http://www.livemint.com/Industry
/HiulunjJR3DSHvftkPonfK/Courtgrants-Novartis-temporary-injunction-againstRanbaxy.html. The patent on Vildagliptin, sold in India under the brand name
Galvus, expires at the end of 2019. Id. In September 2014, the Delhi High Court
granted Novartis’s request for a temporary injunction against Indian drug maker
Ranbaxy Laboratories to prevent it from selling a generic version of the drug. Id.
191
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Unreported
Judgments 2015 (Del.) (India), at para. 74, http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/AKP/
judgement/07-10-2015/AKP07102015S5862013.pdf.
186
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Likewise, Glenmark additionally invoked Section 3(d) in justifying
its choice to issue generic forms of Januvia and Janumet.192 Indeed,
the provision was even cited by Merck to oppose Glenmark’s
actions.193
4. The Philippines and Lipitor (and Lyrica)
The importance of the Indian Supreme Court’s Novartis decision
has not been confined to India alone.194 Soon after its initial passage,
Section 3(d) began to inspire other developing countries to institute
similar provisions. In 2008, through the Universally Accessible
Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act (R.A. 9502), the Philippines
amended its eleven-year-old patent code, which was known as
Republic Act No. 8293 (R.A. 8293),195 by inserting language very
similar to Section 3(d) with two different amendments (Rule 8,
Section 1 dealing with “Non-Patentable Inventions” and Rule 8,
Section 2 dealing with “Inventive Step”196).
With these amendments, the Philippines Congress codified the
amended Indian Patents Act’s heightened bar for patentability as
construed in the Novartis decision as part of its own IPR regime.
Specifically, the amended Section 26.2 of Republic Act 8293
elaborates new rules for a product to qualify as an invention;197 the
192

Id.
Id. at para. 13. Merck’s logic is especially worth considering. For if by its
own admission, Januvia was nothing more than a derivative, why was the
company trying to patent the drug to begin with? Adjusting to the new norm of
triumphant Section 3(d), Merck was left to explain its original attempt at patenting
the salt as a misguided error. See id. at 17.
194
See Rajarshi Banerjee, The Success of, and Response to, India’s Law Against
Patent Layering, 54 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 204, 206–07 (2013).
195
An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the
Intellectual Property Office, Providing for its Powers and Functions, and for Other
Purposes, Rep. Act No. 8293 (1997) (Phil.), http://www.wipo.int
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129343. The act was passed to bring the Philippines
into TRIPS-compliance. See id.
196
See An Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act
No. 6675, or the Generics Act of 1998, and Republic Act No. 5921, or the
Pharmacy Law, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9502 (2008) (Phil.),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=162755.
197
Under a heading entitled “Inventive Step,” Section 26.2 of the Philippines
amended patent code now reads as follows:
193
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amended Section 22 also outlines more stringent criteria for
patentability.198 Indeed, immediately after President Gloria Arroyo
signed the amendments into law, controversy erupted in the country
over Pfizer’s enormously important Lipitor.199
The branded version of atorvastatin, Lipitor, is a lipid-lowering
agent used to treat high cholesterol. The drug is a polymorph salt
form of atorvastatin.200 By 2011, Lipitor was already history’s bestselling drug.201 That same year, however, Pfizer’s U.S. patent was
set to expire, with its Philippines patent to follow suit soon after in
2012.202 As a modified salt form, the compound underlying Lipitor
became a repeated source of conflict throughout the world—from
In the case of drugs and medicines, there is no inventive step if the
invention results from the mere discovery of a new form or new property
of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the
known efficacy of that substance, or the mere discovery of any new
property or new use for a known substance, or the mere use of a known
process unless such known process results in a new product that employs
at least one new reactant.
R.A. 8293, as Amended by an Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property
Code, Republic Act No. 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988, and Republic Act No.
5021 or the Pharmacy Law, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act. 9502, § 26.2 (June
6,
2008)
(Phil.),
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf
/philippines_e/e_tizai.pdf. Banerjee’s brief discussion of the Act is slightly
confusing in that it references only the change to Section 22.1. See Banerjee, supra
note 194, at 227.
198
Section 22.1 now reads as follows:
[I]n the case of drugs and medicines, the mere discovery of a new form or
new property of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance, or the mere
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance, or the
mere use of a known process unless such known process results in a new
product that employs at least one new reactant.
R.A. 8293 § 22.1.
199
See Mukherjeel, supra note 180.
200
Informational Page on Lipitor, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/lipitor.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
201
See Matthew Herper, Why There Will Never Be Another Drug Like Lipitor,
FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper
/2011/11/30/why-there-will-never-be-another-drug-like-lipitor/.
202
Ray Butch Gamboa, Lipitor v. Avamax, PHILSTAR GLOBAL (Feb. 27, 2010.
12:00 AM), http://www.philstar.com/business/552870/lipitor-vs-avamax.
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Australia, to South Korea, to India, and to the United Kingdom.203 In
2009, the largest pharmaceutical maker in the Philippines, United
Laboratories Inc. (Unilab), launched its own generic version of the
drug.204 Arguing that the initial 1990 patent on atorvastatin had
already expired, Unilab petitioned the Philippines Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) to also cancel the patent on the salt form of
the molecule in July 2009, claiming it was no more than a frivolous
invention representing a minor modification that did not pass muster
under the country’s amended patent code.205 By August 2009, Unilab
was selling its own generic version of Lipitor under the name
Avamax.206 In 2011, Pfizer attained a writ of preliminary injunction
against Unilab.207 The next year, in a surprising turn of events, the
same court that issued the earlier injunction reversed course,

203

Pfizer unsuccessfully sued Indian generics maker Ranbaxy for infringing its
Lipitor patent in Norway in 2007. See Allen Andrew Alvarez, Protecting
Intellectual Property Versus Making Essential Medicines Affordable, 5 ASIAN
BIOETHICS REV. 371, 372–73 (2013). Ranbaxy did agree to wait until 2011 to
release its generic version. Id. In 2008, a South Korean patent court deemed
Pfizer’s patent on Lipitor invalid. Id. On Australia and the U.K., see Michael
Sutton, Lipitor and Atorvastatin: Pfizer Successfully Defends Misuse of Market
Power Case, DIBBSBARKER (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com
/australia/x/381932/Trade+Regulation+Practices/Lipitor+and+atorvastatin+Pfize
r+successfully+defends+misuse+of+market+power+case; Kevin Grogan, Pfizer
Settles with Teva over Lipitor in UK, PHARMATIMES (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/news/pfizer_settles_with_teva_over_lipitor_in_uk
_980269.
204
Sandeep Kanak Rathod, Ever-greening: A Status Check in Selected
Countries, 7 J. GENERIC MED. 227, 237–38 (2010). The controversy is detailed
further in Rathod’s article. See id.
205
See Philippines Battle Between Pfizer And Unilab Continues, MIRANDAH:
CONNECTING ASIA (Mar. 17, 2010), https://www.mirandah.com/pressroom/
item/64-battle-between-pfizer-and-unilab-continues/; Roel Landingin, Pfizer
Takes Aim in Patent Row, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 24, 2009),
https://www.ft.com/content/19afde18-d922-11de-b2d500144feabdc0?mhq5j=e5; Rathod, supra note 204, at 238.
206
See Philippines Battle Between Pfizer And Unilab Continues, supra note 205.
207
InterAksyon, Cocktales: Justices Reverse Themselves, Allow Unilab To Sell
Anti-Cholesterol Generic, FACEBOOK (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.facebook.com
/InteraksyonTV5/posts/370955042977682.
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claiming it had previously overlooked important legal and factual
issues.208
Given these events, it may not be surprising that Unilab soon
after threatened to make another generic version of a different Pfizer
blockbuster-drug, Lyrica.209 Known by its generic name, pregabalin,
Lyrica is an anticonvulsant used to treat seizures and epilepsy, for
which its maker sought secondary patents based on its use for
treating chronic neuropathic pain.210 It was first approved for various
uses in the U.S. and the E.U. in 2004 and was marketed the
following year.211
Pfizer’s squabbles over its Lyrica patents began in 2009 when
several Indian companies sought marketing approvals from the FDA
for generic versions of the drug.212 In response, Pfizer pursued legal
action in U.S. courts, a strategy that culminated in a June 2014
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
prohibiting the appearance of generic competitors until 2018.213
Although Pfizer’s victory at the D.C. Circuit came in the face of
claims that the patent on pregabalin failed to describe any new
invention,214 the legal situation in the Philippines has acquired a
different significance, given the Section 3(d)-style language the
country has enshrined in its own IP code.215 Indeed, from the outset
of its public pronouncements threatening to make a generic version
208
209

Id.
See Philippines Battle Between Pfizer And Unilab Continues, supra note

205.

210

Lyrica, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/lyrica.html (last updated Nov.
6, 2017).
211
Lyrica Approval History, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/history
/lyrica.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2017).
212
See N. LALITHA, Access to Indian Generic Drugs: Emerging Issues, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ACCESS TO
DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 225, 236 (Kenneth C. Shadlen et al. eds.,
2011).
213
See Susan Decker, Pfizer Wins Ruling to Block Generic Lyrica Until 2018,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2014-02-06/pfizer-wins-ruling-to-block-generic-lyrica-until-2018. The
circuit court upheld the district court’s finding of infringement on the patent,
particularly on claim 2 of what was called the “819 patent.” Id.
214
Id.
215
See Banerjee, supra note 194.
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of Lyrica available in the Philippines, Unilab was hewing closely to
that language, claiming that Pfizer’s secondary patent was for a
method of use, rather than any genuinely new invention resulting in
an “enhancement of the known efficacy.”216 Therefore, even
notwithstanding the conflicting outcomes of the ongoing legal
battle, in the Philippines itself and in the U.S., the controversy will
likely reverberate in the years to come.
5. Argentina (and Beyond)
Like the Philippines, Argentina has also moved to incorporate
Section 3(d)-style provisions into its national IP regime.217 In May
2012, the country’s Ministries of Industry and Health, together with
its National Institute for Industrial Property (Argentina’s patent
office), issued a joint regulation expanding the “Guidelines for
Examination of Patentability of Patent Applications concerning
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions.”218 The new guidelines set
out additional grounds for barring the patentability of a product,
including several reasons relating to minor modifications to existing
compounds.219 Polymorphs, like hydrates and solvates, enantiomers,
active metabolites, salts, and derivatives of known substances, are
thus singled out as non-patentable.220 As Banerjee observes, the
stricture both evokes and exceeds Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents
Act since it is meant to deny patentability to such derivatives, even
in the event that they can be demonstrated to result in enhanced
efficacy, whether therapeutic or otherwise.221
As the Argentinian example illustrates, concern over the NCD
crisis in the developing world is clearly generating a resurgent
questioning of strict approaches to patent rights—and along varied
216

Philippines Battle Between Pfizer and Unilab Continues, MIRANDAH, (Mar.
17, 2010). https://www.mirandah.com/pressroom/item/64-battle-between-pfizerand-unilab-continues/.
217
See Joint Resolutions Nos. 118/2012, 546/2012 and 107/2012, May 2, 2012,
B.O. (Arg.).
218
Id.
219
See Shouvik Kumar Guha, Argentina Goes the Section 3(d) Way: Creases
of Worry for the Pharmaceutical Patent Applicants?, SPICY IP (May 23, 2012),
http://spicyip.com/2012/05/argentina-goes-3d-way-creases-of-worry.html.
220
Id.
221
Banerjee, supra note 194, at 228.
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avenues. Indeed, in Argentina, it is a norm countering the lowering
of the bar for patentability that has been instantiated at the level of
the ins and outs of patent examination more than in the provisions
of the country’s IP code. Indeed, it is Argentina’s South American
counterpart, Brazil, which best exemplifies this observation. Its
“prior consent” mechanism222 thus requires all grants of patents for
pharmaceutical products and processes to first be approved by the
country’s National Sanitary Vigilance Agency (ANVISA).223
Celebrated and attacked in equal measure as a policy intervention,
prior consent has left ANVISA besieged on all sides, both
domestically and internationally. Of course, using “policy space” for
patent examination is neither new nor specific to NCDs, as Kenneth
Shadlen points out.224 Nevertheless, there is little argument that
Argentina’s new examination guidelines mirror and reflect the
influence of India’s newly validated heightened bar for patentability
under Section 3(d).
Well beyond the Philippines and Argentina, we find a growing
list of countries that have considered or are considering adopting
Section 3(d) language, or effectively similar measures, to restrict the
patentability of compounds on the grounds of insufficient
modifications. Beyond those discussed above, these countries
include: Thailand,225 South Africa,226 Brazil,227 Malaysia, Indonesia,
222

See Law No. 10.196 of Feb. 14, 2001, CÓDIGO DE PROPIEDADE INDUSTRIAL
[C.P.I.] (Braz.). The requirement was instituted through an amendment to Article
229 of the 2001 Brazilian Industrial Property Law. Id.
223
See generally KENNETH SHADLEN, The Politics of Pharmaceutical Patent
Examination in Brazil, in KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: REASSERTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 139 (Leonardo Berlamaqui et al. eds., 2012).
224
Id. at 151–57.
225
New Patent Examinations Guidelines in Thailand, IP KOMODO (Sep 13,
2013), http://ipkomododragon.blogspot.com/2013/09/new-patent-examinationguidelines-for.html; Patent Evergreening in Thailand, IP KOMODO (Sep. 8, 2011),
http://ipkomododragon.blogspot.com/2011/09/patent-evergreening-inthailand.html.
226
See Julia E. Hill, Changes to Intellectual Property Policy in South Africa:
Putting a Stop to Evergreening?, 24 EXPERT OPINION THERAPEUTIC PATENTS
839, 843 (2014).
227
It is often observed that Brazil’s approach to IP regime design has been a
combination of extremes. See CASSANDRA M. SWEET, The Political Economy of
Pharmaceutical Production in Brazil, in THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
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and China.228 Ultimately, in the years to come, conflicts over
patentability in the context of NCD drugs are likely to only increase.
B. Compulsory Licensing (of Cancer Drugs)
Compulsory licensing allows a government or third party to
reproduce patented products or processes without the consent of the
patent owner.229 Because governments make such allowances in a
variety of ways, compulsory licensing is a term that designates a
class of scenarios, rather than a single policy form. With compulsory
licensing, government authorization is either more or less explicit
and thus results in numerous formal definitions. For example, to
some, compulsory licenses are “involuntary contract[s] between a
willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the
state.”230 As economists Eric Bond and Kamal Saggi observe, other
definitions emphasize the involuntary component and equate
compulsory licensing with patent breaking.231
Discussion of compulsory licensing has increased significantly
with the formation of the WTO and the passage of its underlying
Marrakesh and associated agreements. Article 31 of the TRIPS
made the practice permissible from the inception of the WTO.232
PHARMACEUTICALS 29–47 (Hans Löfgren & Owain David Williams, eds., 2013).
Counterpoised with the prior consent mechanism discussed above was an
extremely wide definition for what qualifies as an invention. Id.
228
Lisa Kilday, Global IP Reaction to India’s Rejection of the Novartis Drug
Patent, IP WATCHDOG (May 28, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com
/2013/05/28/global-ip-reaction-to-indias-rejection-of-the-novartis-drugpatent/id=40778/.
229
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and Trips, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2017).
230
Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales
and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 349, 349 (1993).
231
Eric W. Bond & Kamal Saggi, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls and
Access to Patented Foreign Products, 109 J. DEV. ECON. 217, 218 n. 6 (2014).
232
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 31. In relevant part, it reads:
[S]uch use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been
successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be
waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other
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However, its role as a potential policy mechanism became truly
visible only as civil society actors and treatment access advocates
sought to clarify its meaning.233 Compulsory licensing was featured
prominently at the WTO’s 2001 Doha Ministerial meeting as one of
the TRIPS-flexibilities under discussion.234 Indeed, it was the Doha
Declaration’s demand for clarification on Article 31235 that started
the process leading to the 2005 proposal to amend the TRIPS.236
It should be noted that the intensity of efforts to confirm the
TRIPS-compliance of compulsory licensing is disproportionately
greater than the frequency of its use, especially by developing
countries. If anything, the struggle to clarify what the TRIPS permits
is as good of an indicator of opposition to compulsory licensing as
it is of support.237 Accordingly, long after the Doha Declaration,
developing countries do not have any easy paths toward actually
licensing drugs. India, often painted as one of the worst abusers of
the practice, received its first application for a compulsory license
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where
the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or
has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by
or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly.
Id. (emphasis added).
233
In the United States especially, among the leading organizations working on
the issue has been Knowledge Ecology International. For its work on compulsory
licensing, see Compulsory licenses, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L,
https://www.keionline.org/cl (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
234
MOHAMMAD TOWHIDUL ISLAM, TRIPS AGREEMENT OF THE WTO:
IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH 266 (2013).
235
On the limits of Article 31, see Mike Gumbel, Is Article 31 Big Enough?
The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory
Licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 161 (2008).
236
See Jerome Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical
Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. ETHICS 247 (2009) (describing
how compulsory licensing survived the initial TRIPS negotiations).
237
See id. at 261. Opposition also continues outside of WTO channels. See Ed
Silverman, Pharma Narrowly Defines When Compulsory Licenses Should Be
Used, WALL ST. J.: PHARMALOT (Feb. 24, 2015, 1:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/pharmalot/2015/02/24/pharma-narrowly-defines-when-compulsory-licensesshould-be-used/.
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in 2011. To date, that application for the drug Nexavar is the only
compulsory license the country has ever issued in the post-TRIPS
era.238 This can be compared with more than 1,000 pharmaceutical
patent approvals the country granted from 2007 to 2010 alone.239
Recent studies confirm this general observation. According to
one analysis, since 1995, there have been only 24 “verified”
episodes in which “a [compulsory license] was publicly entertained
or announced by a WTO member state.”240 Of the 24 verified
episodes, nearly half occurred between 2003 and 2005, during the
small window that opened in the immediate aftermath of the Doha
Declaration.241 Only 13 of the verified episodes resulted in the
issuance of licenses that were actually compulsory; three others
resulted in voluntary agreements to license in the wake of
negotiations, and of the remaining eight, the majority lead to nothing
more than a price discount.242 Furthermore, the total number of
“potential,” rather than “verified,” episodes the researchers found
summed to only 34.243
What countries were involved in the 24 verified episodes?
Thirteen cases concerned upper-middle income countries, and
another three cases concerned high-income countries.244 Lowincome (including “least developed”) countries were almost entirely
absent.245 Finally, the large majority of verified episodes involved
licensing or price discounting of drugs for treating HIV/AIDS.246 Of
course, HIV/AIDS is a unique ailment due to both its visibility and
238

Sai Vinod, Why Aren’t There Any Takers for Compulsory Licenses?, SPICY
IP (Feb. 12, 2013), http://spicyip.com/2013/02/why-arent-there-any-takersfor.html.
239
Id.
240
Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS
MED. 1, 1 (2012).
241
Id. (explaining that 11 of 24 were episodes occurred within a two-year
period).
242
Id. at 9.
243
Id. at 3.
244
Id. at 4.
245
Id. at 4.
246
Id. (explaining that 16 of 24 episodes involved drugs for treating
HIV/AIDS).
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the way it explicitly figured into the campaigns for treatment access
that led to the Doha Declaration in the first place.247
Thus, despite what many may assume, compulsory licensing by
developing countries is rare and difficult. Nevertheless, each next
potential case is easily a magnet for recrimination. Consequently,
developing countries face a standing risk even when entertaining
these licenses, let alone if they try to issue actual licenses. Indeed,
when attempts have been made, powerful countries have been quick
to communicate that their discontent may be made manifest through
the WTO’s remediation system, a playing field that many suggest is
not level.248
These circumstances call for an evaluation of compulsory
licensing from both a qualitative and a quantitative approach. Even
though there are too few instances of such licensing to provide a
strong statistical trend over time, individual examples still reveal
important information about how battle lines have been drawn and
redrawn.
1. The Thai Prelude to Recent Events
Recently, the international community marked an important
moment in the compulsory licensing saga, making for a culmination
of sorts in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This took place in 2007,
when Thailand and Brazil sanctioned licenses for two on-patent
HIV/AIDS drugs, Abbott/Abvie’s Kaletra and Merck’s Efavirenz,
within
less
than
six
months
of
one
another.249
Concomitant with its Kaletra and Efavirenz decisions, Thailand led
the way toward pushing the battle over compulsory licensing into
the field of NCD therapies as well. In January of 2007, the country’s
Health Ministry authorized a generic version of clopidogrel
bisulfate, an anti-platelet medicine used to fight heart disease that is
jointly marketed by Bristol-Myers Squibb and the French
247

Id. at 1.
See, e.g., ETHAN KAPSTEIN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AN UNFAIR WORLD:
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD (2006); Surya Subedi, The Notion of Free
Trade and the First Ten Years of the World Trade Organization: How Level is the
‘Level Playing Field’?, 53 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 273 (2006).
249
Thailand licensed Kaletra in January 2007 and Brazil licensed Efavirenz in
May. See Bond & Saggi, supra note 231, at 218.
248
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multinational Sanofi-Aventis under the brand name Plavix.250 In
2008, the Health Ministry then upped the ante by adding several
anti-cancer medications to its list, including Gleevec, docetaxel,
erlotinib, and femara.251 The Gleevec case resulted in a price
discount, rather than a license,252 while the other three cases are
ongoing.
Not surprisingly, a vigorous pushback against Thailand set in.
Opponents in the industry and the USTR alleged that the country
failed to follow proper procedures by neglecting to negotiate with
the patent holders first.253 For its part, Thailand contended that prior
negotiation was only necessary in the case of licenses for
commercial use under Section 51 of the country’s Patent Act.254 Its
own Health Ministry, Thailand argued, was issuing licenses only for
public use,255 which required notification from the Department of
Disease Control alone.256 Notwithstanding Thailand’s defense of its
action, the controversy still stifled the momentum of the Health
Ministry’s actions. To date, none of the licenses for NCD drugs that
the country made notifications for in the period from 2007 to 2008
pursuant to Section 51—whether for Plavix or any of the three anticancer medicines—have been fully executed. In fact, even for its
two HIV/AIDS drugs, only the license for Efavirenz has been fully
executed; the license for Kaletra has not been.257
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Thailand’s attempt to push its battles into the NCD context is
best regarded as a precursor to a more insistent effort to reorient
compulsory licensing policies that has been afoot for more than five
years. An example of a more urgent situation is India’s licensing of
the cancer drug Nexavar in 2012. The Nexavar decision reopened
not one, but two different conversations about compulsory licensing
in the NCD crisis. One conversation broached the issue of licensing
on the grounds of non-commercial use that has been at the heart of
the efforts by Thailand. The other conversation broached licensing
on the grounds of a so-called failure to work a patent locally.258 The
latter conversation has been largely dormant since 2001, when the
U.S. was forced to withdraw a WTO suit against Brazil for
AIDS/HIV treatment that involved failure to work issues. With the
Nexavar controversy pushing the question into the NCD context,
however, matters changed considerably.
2. India and Nexavar
As for the controversies that have erupted in cases of patent
denial, India has been at the center of those involving the
compulsory licensing of NCD drugs as well. For much the same
reason, India also demonstrates the vulnerability of any emerging
consensus in favor of reframing the access-incentivization polarity
around NCDs.
As the controversy over Gleevec was unfolding, India found
itself at the center of another storm involving the very first
compulsory license the country approved on a patented
product/process in the post-TRIPS era. As in the Gleevec case, the
Nexavar case involved a prominent cancer drug, although the

258
Failure to work is a technical doctrine that has traditionally meant the
failure to work a patent industrially, as in by manufacturing the given patented
product or by failing to apply in some relevant industrial application the given
patented process. ‘Working a patent’ locally means the failure to
manufacture/apply the patent locally. In the TRIPS context the question of
whether a patent can be “worked” “locally” has crystallized around whether
such a requirement can be satisfied by mere import of a patented drug or
whether actual local manufacturing is required. See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO,
THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS, 283-93 (2010).
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German multinational Bayer held the rights.259 Known under its
chemical name as sorafenib, Nexavar is another tyrosine kinase
inhibitor used as a targeted therapy in the treatment of certain
kidney, liver, and thyroid cancers.260 Sorafenib was developed by
Bayer in conjunction with the San Francisco-based Onyx
Pharmaceuticals and was approved for use by the FDA in 2005 and
the E.U. in 2006.261 Nexavar is the tosylate salt version of
sorafenib.262
The origins of the Nexavar controversy date back to 2001 when
Bayer applied for patent protection in India. It received protection
in 2008.263 Cipla, a generics manufacturer, then requested approval
to launch a generic version of the medicine, and Bayer’s initial
attempt to squash Cipla’s request was denied by the Delhi High
Court.264 An exorbitantly expensive drug, Nexavar was sold only in
small quantities in 2009 and 2010.265 Once the drug initially became
available, Cipla announced that it would actually launch its generic
version under the name Soranib in February 2010.266 A month later,
in March 2010, Bayer returned to the Delhi High Court and sued
Cipla for patent infringement.267 In response, Cipla challenged the
validity of Bayer’s patent and countersued for its revocation.268 The
Cipla trial commenced before the Delhi High Court on March 23,
2011.269 The entire case, however, was overtaken by other events,
with Natco, another Indian generic manufacturer, filing a
259
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compulsory licensing application on Nexavar only four months later
in the summer of 2011.270 The Controller General of Patents,
Designs & Trademarks approved Natco’s application six months
later on March 9, 2012.271
Key to both Natco’s application and the Controller General’s
approval was the scarcity of sorafenib on the Indian market. The
Controller General thus found that Bayer had made no effort to
manufacture the drug locally or to import it.272 In light of its claim
that Bayer had failed to “locally work” its patent in India under
Section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act,273 Natco proposed that if it was
granted a compulsory license it would make its generic version of
sorafenib available for Rs.8,800/month (as compared to
Rs.280,428/month for branded Nexavar and Rs.30,000/month for
Cipla’s Soranib).274 While under the terms of the license Natco was
required to pay a six percent royalty, Bayer still appealed the
Controller General’s decision to the IPAB but was met with defeat
on March 4, 2013.275 Although Bayer continued to press its
challenge against the Natco license—both to the Bombay High
Court276 and Indian Supreme Court277—it was unsuccessful.
270
Khomba Singh, Natco Pharma Files India’s First Compulsory Licence Plea,
THE
ECONOMIC
TIMES
(Aug.
2,
2011,
5:15
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IST),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-02/news/29842834_1
_compulsory-licence-sorafenib-tosylate-natco-pharma.
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Compulsory License App. No. 1 of 2011 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai, March
9, 2011) (India). http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm.
272
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273
In India, applications for compulsory licenses can be filed any time after
three years from the date of the grant of a patent provided that “the patented
invention is not worked in the territory of India.” The Patents Act (India), No. 39
of 1970, § 84(1)(c), INDIA CODE (1970).
274
In the Matter of Natco Pharma Limited, supra note 271, at 15.
275
Bayer v. Union of India & Natco, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM (Intellectual
Property Appellate Board, Chennai, March 4, 2013) (India),
http://www.ipabindia.in/pdfs/order-45-2013.pdf.
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Writ Petition, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India & Others, No. 1323/2013
(Bombay H.C. July 15, 2014) (India).
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The Supreme Court dismissed Bayer’s appeal, which it sought through
special leave. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India
& Others, (C) No. 30145/2014 (SC Dec. 12, 2014) (India).
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Both the Controller General and the IPAB (partly) based their
decisions against Bayer on Section 84(1)(b)278 of the Patents Act,
finding the company failed to make sorafenib “available to the
public at a reasonably affordable price.”279 More controversially,
they also weighed in on the nature of India’s “local working”
requirement under Section 84(1)(c).280 Indeed, from the very
inception of the WTO, there was confusion about the status of such
provisions under the TRIPS. Article 27.1’s seeming negation of
local working requirements,281 for example, contradicts Article 31’s
seeming allowance of them.282 It is no wonder that such
contradictions soon reached the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), most importantly with the U.S. suit against Brazil in 2001.283
That case revolved around a local working requirement Brazil had
included in the new industrial property law it had enacted in order
to bring itself into TRIPS-compliance.284
Given its indeterminate outcome, the U.S.-Brazil case ushered
in nearly fifteen years of uncertainty around local working
requirements under the TRIPS agreement. Of course, as in many
other areas of IP regime design, the states that had been most central
to the WTO’s creation continued to construe local working through
the lens of the TRIPS as a mechanism for eliminating
“protectionism.”285 Any robust version of local working was thus
portrayed as antithetical to the spirit of liberalization, a stance that
stymied the emergence of any clear definition of what it meant to
278

The Patents Act (India), § 84(1)(b).
Id. § 84(1)(c).
280
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281
See Panel Report, Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (Can.). For contrary views in academic
literature, see, for example, Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation
in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local
Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275 (2010).
282
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 31.
283
See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under
the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27
YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 380–83 (2002).
284
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of public scrutiny. Id at 381.
285
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“work” a patent.286 In the wake of the U.S.-Brazil case, therefore,
confusion remained around whether local working requirements
were among the TRIPS’ oft-proclaimed flexibilities.287
Continuing on this long interim of indeterminacy, the Nexavar
controversy in its own right should be seen as a landmark
controversy, much like the Gleevec case. Centering on a cancer
drug, it is a clear departure from the unresolved 2001 dispute
between the U.S. and Brazil about local working in the context of
AIDS/HIV treatments.288 Equally notable is that the Controller
General and the IPAB in India addressed the local working issue in
distinct ways. According to the Controller General, to work the
patent in India required that Nexavar had to be domestically
manufactured, especially given Bayer’s existing facilities and
operations in the country.289 The Controller General thus rejected
Bayer’s claim that its nominal imports of Nexavar into India met
this requirement.290 In the Controller’s own words, local working
means “manufactured to a reasonable extent in India.”291
The IPAB, on the other hand, ruled out deciding a priori that
working “totally excludes import, or that ‘working’ is synonymous
to ‘import’ and that if there is no manufacture in India, then there is
no working.”292 Instead, it held that a case-by-case approach to the
meaning of the requirement was needed, with it ultimately being the
patentee’s responsibility to “show why [the patented product] could
286
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288
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not be locally manufactured.”293 The IPAB was eager to note that
like the Controller, it was of the “of the opinion that the word
‘worked’ has a flexible meaning;” moreover, it would be insensible
to allow the local working requirement to be “satisfied by having
import monopoly for all patented inventions.”294 Ultimately,
therefore, the IPAB’s decision functioned to secure the local
working as a basis for compulsory licensing under Section 84 of the
Patents Act.295
At the same time, the validation of the Nexavar compulsory
license in India was more than just an endorsement of a traditional
TRIPS flexibility. Indeed, more importantly, it opened a new front
in the long-standing battle over national patent regime design in an
age of pushing for the upward harmonization of IPR standards
through free trade agreements.296 With so many on-patent drugs
reaching India through import,297 a blanket prohibition against
equating import with local working would probably not have
withstood political pressure. The way in which the Controller
General and IPAB’s decisions both broached and stopped short of
prohibiting any such equivalence between import and local working,
therefore, must be appreciated as the complex strategic maneuver it
effectively comprised.
3. India and Possible Compulsory Licenses for Other Cancer
Drugs
A dramatic series of events followed after the licensing of
Nexavar. In January 2013 the Indian Government’s Union Health
Ministry proposed to the Department of Industrial Property and
Promotion (DIPP) that the Government should proceed to license
three other cancer drugs.298 On the list were the biologic
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trastuzumab, marketed under the name Herceptin by the Roche
Pharmaceuticals-owned Genentech,299 Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
ixabepilone, a tubule binding multi-drug resistant chemotherapeutic
agent, and the tyrosine kinase inhibitor dasatinib, another BristolMyers Squibb drug, which is used to fight chronic myeloid leukemia
and marketed under the name Sprycel.300 Not surprisingly, the
announcement further increased the torrent of recrimination by the
pharmaceutical industry and accelerated efforts by the U.S. to
reverse India’s course.301 Thus far, none of these cancer drugs has
laid the basis for India in issuing its second-ever compulsory license.
Indeed, significant legal blows were dealt to the cases of
trastuzumab/Herceptin and dasatinib/Sprycel very quickly; in the
case of trastuzumab, the DIPP even went so far as to declare that it
would be ignoring its counterpart agency’s plea.302
Even so, the controversy did not simply end. In August 2013,
Roche unexpectedly announced it would not attempt to renew its
Indian Herceptin patent.303 The company then promptly brought suit
against the India’s Biocon along with the U.S. generic maker,
Mylan, after the duo obtained regulatory approval to sell a jointly
developed “biosimilar”304 version of trastuzumab on the Indian
/Companies/F3Rn5jCkKjCJNYzhtuQseO/Health-ministry-recommendscompulsory-licensing-of-three-ant.html.
299
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301
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market.305 Although the Delhi High Court blocked Mylan and
Biocon from launching their generic Herceptin competitor in
February 2014, other loose ends of the controversy persisted.306
In February 2013, the Indian company BDR Pharmaceuticals
submitted to the Mumbai-patent office the second ever application
for a compulsory license in India during the post-TRIPS era, this
time for dasatinib/Sprycel.307 BDR proposed to sell its generic
competitor for Rs.8,000 (or US$130) for a month’s treatment as
compared to the Rs.160,000 (or US$2,600) that Bristol-Myers
Squibb charges.308 Once more official action created a roadblock in
October 2013, when the Controller General of the IPO rejected the
licensing application on technical grounds, refusing to consider its
merits because of BDR’s failure to make out a prima facie case.309
Exactly how to interpret this rather dizzying series of events is a
complicated matter. On the one hand, the clear setbacks to the
licensing of both Herceptin and Sprycel may indicate that the
Nexavar decision will, in the long term, have less practical
significance than it first seemed. Yet while political reality may be
case for older versions of traditional small molecule drugs. As a result, a great
deal of controversy surrounds biosimilar patent approval by health authorities and
IPR issues. See Ganesan Marimuthu et al., Maintaining Patents Protecting
Biologics or Small-Molecule Drugs, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 50 (2012); Vincent J.
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305
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pushing in such a direction, it is still misleading to make too much
of this development.310 Indeed, even in the case of Herceptin and
Sprycel, there was no simple reversal of the larger implications of
the Nexavar decision. Already from January 2013, when India’s
Health Ministry began urging the DIPP to issue licenses for
trastuzumab, ixabepilone, and dasatinib, the basis it proposed for
doing so had nothing to do with Section 84 of the Patents Act or its
local working provision. Rather, the proposal was for the DIPP to
invoke the “national emergency” basis for compulsory licensing
under Section 92.311 In contrast to Section 84, Section 92 does not
require the costly litigation step of filing a plea; instead, under
Section 92 compulsory licenses can be issued directly upon notice
from the central government for “national emergency, urgency, or
public non-commercial use.”312
Whatever the final fate of Herceptin and Sprycel may be, it does
not necessarily limit the significance of the Nexavar decision. Even
the failed attempt by BDR Pharmaceuticals to secure a license on
Herceptin (which was pursued via the Section 84 route) was not
rejected on its merits but only on the threshold issue of pleading.313
Moreover, with the Delhi High Court’s decision, the battle over
Herceptin has, in a sense, simply reverted back to Section 92.
Indeed, the negative judicial outcome on the Section 84 application
reinvigorated the Union Health Ministry’s calls to issue a direct
government license and a growing rift with the DIPP.314 Of course,
there is no guarantee that the Health Ministry’s position will win
out—all the less, in fact, given that the DIPP, which is charged with
taking final action, has clearly grown more rather than less hostile
to invoking Section 92.315
310
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Regardless, these events have reopened another crucial debate,
as onlookers have been left to behold a major developing country
potentially
invoking
the
national
emergency/extreme
urgency/public non-commercial use basis316 of licensing. That
another potential TRIPS-flexibility that had been dormant for years
should come back to life in the context of cancer/NCD drugs makes
recent events in India unprecedented.317 Therefore, even if the
radical challenge of national emergency-based compulsory
licensing does not come to fruition,318 the ongoing controversy
around Section 92 is likely to shore up the nascent jurisprudence of
Section 84’s “local working” that may have its own potential radical
consequences. Indeed, the more that old battle lines are redrawn in
the context of NCD drugs, the less likely it becomes that conflicts
transpiring within those lines will easily be contained. There is, in
other words, only so much of their reputational capital that
pharmaceutical multinationals can spend in opposition, especially
within any single country and especially as it becomes more
apparent that the economics of the access-incentivization debate
applies very differently to drugs for NCDs as compared to their
counterparts for infectious diseases.
316
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4. Ecuador and Licenses for Cancer, Arthritis, and Other Drugs
Alongside Brazil, Ecuador has been the other Latin American
country taking the lead in compulsory licensing. While many
counterparts in Latin America allow for the practice, to date only
these two countries have actually issued licenses. 319 The legal basis
for Ecuadorian licensing is grounded in Article 363(7) of the
country’s constitution—obligating the state to guarantee availability
and access to quality medicines.320 Further provision is also made
through Presidential Decree 118 from 2009, which allows licenses
to be “granted at any time for reasons of public interest, emergency,
or national security.”321 Under Ecuador’s rule regime, requests for
compulsory licenses must first be submitted to the country’s
Institute of Intellectual Property (IEPI), with successful licensor’s
then (possibly) obliged to pay a royalty to the patent holder.322 Under
this procedure, the IEPI made its first licensing decisions—for
AIDS/HIV drugs—in 2010, with a second round completed for
additional anti-retrovirals in 2012.323 By the end of 2014, the IEPI
had considered or was considering some 32 other applications, with
nine licenses in total having been issued by that point.324 Among the
applications were a high number for NCD drugs, including
etoricoxib, Merck’s anti-inflammatory compound for arthritis
branded under Arcoxia, Nucoxia, and Vargis; Novartis’ Myfortic,
the sodium salt of mycophenolic acid, an immunosuppressant used
in post-transplant patients; Pfizer’s sunitinib, a tyrosine kinase
inhibitor used to treat several cancers marketed under as Sutent; and
certolizumab, a monoclonal antibody used in the treatment of
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Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis, which Belgium’s UCB
markets under the name Cimzia.325
Ecuador’s history of licensing since 2009 is noteworthy, not
simply because it demonstrates a steady advance beyond HIV/AIDS
drugs or even because the country has been able to avoid
recrimination in a way not all of its counterparts have. The country’s
actions also stand out because of the diversity of the NCD drugs it
has moved to make available. The certolizumab case, similar to
Herceptin in India, is of interest as it supports licensing in the new
area of biologics.326 In this respect, Ecuador has taken the lead in
questioning the norm of strict patent rights via licensing efforts
beyond infectious disease drugs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Part VI focused only on controversies involving two
mechanisms by which developing countries have been shifting their
efforts to contest the norm of strict patent rights in the context of
therapies for NCDs. However, there are other mechanisms that
developing countries are considering besides simply heightening the
bar for patenting modifications and compulsory licensing. In India,
for example, there has been renewed discussion around a twentyfirst-century version of price ceilings on pharmaceuticals. Other
governments, like those in China and South Africa, continue to
consider ways to revise their patent codes. In still other countries,
the high price of cancer medicines has led to the possibility of
outright patent revocation.
At the same time, it is not only on the grounds of these shifting
facts that we must now ask whether counter-harmonizing away from
drug patents may emerge as a new norm rather than just a series of
exceptions proving strict IPR the rule. Rather, this Article has also
sought to show how these shifting facts make the ostensibly pure
theoretical dilemma between the norms of access and
incentivization seem less compelling than it has otherwise been
325
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made to seem. Of course, this is not to say that the Article has denied
there is any tension between access and incentivization—at least at
some sufficiently high level of abstraction and provided that drug
patents remain a cornerstone of our innovation system.
However, by implicitly envisioning access solely in terms of the
availability to the world’s poor of treatments for conditions that only
or primarily afflict them, we have allowed an otherwise remote
possibility—of multinationals becoming altogether unable to
deliver therapies to the market—seem as if it is acute. As with
ostensibly context-free normative reasoning in general, the accessincentivization dilemma has thus carried an inherent tendency to
facilitate status quo arrangements and directions of movement in
law and policy making.
Indeed, it is because of this reason that this Article has eschewed
simply taking a traditional path of a normative argument for or
against drug patents. By highlighting how the legal and
administrative conflict in the developing world has tracked the
changing face of its public health crisis more closely than existing
discussion in the developed world, it instead urges decision makers
to capitalize on the dramatic natural experiment now unfolding
before our eyes. It is thus crucial to see that there has never been a
better way to gauge whether departing from a regime of strict IPR
will really push us to the brink of a world without medicines. Indeed,
as the one example of infectious disease drugs that are close in their
economics to those for NCDs has already shown, harmonizing away
from strict patent rights has hardly prevented new forms of
HIV/AIDS combination therapy from materializing. In fact, they
have actually proliferated—much to the benefit of individuals in
both the developing and developed world.
In the final analysis, therefore, this Article’s plea is for policy
makers to ensure that the natural experiment that the NCD crisis has
created comes to fruition. In so doing, decision makers will be
encouraging solutions that add to or even improve upon the best
existing proposals for solving the ongoing drugs-for-the-developing
world dilemma as it advances into its second generation of visibility.
This is because existing proposals have tended to focus on actions
by international institutions subject to a great deal of internal inertia
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and political pressure from the major power holders within the
international system than developing countries themselves face.
Given the focus of these proposals, moreover, they also have the
downside of tending to leave the supposed normative intractability
of the access-incentivization dilemma intact.
In contrast, the solutions this Article tracks are not only practical
but also possibly more forceful insofar as they originate from
initiatives that are already being implemented by ground level actors
in the developing world. This Article has argued that it is those
actors who have led the way in addressing the public health crises
their countries face to reconsider the true ethical and economic
burdens that remain if pharmaceutical patenting is the default.
Of course, it may only be a coincidence that the shifting context
of legal and administrative conflict in low and middle-income
countries has ended up dovetailing with the unexpected popular
support in high-income countries for renegotiating the terms of free
trade liberalization. Yet, even so, law and policy makers would be
remiss if they fail to see the great opportunity that exists within the
seeming crisis the world order is now going through. As we garner
better evidence about the consequences of deviating from strict IPR
in the NCD drug context, we will only end up better positioned to
rewrite the rules of our global innovation system in a way that makes
sense for a twenty-first century that has moved well past its postCold War antecedents.
Finally, although this Article has focused on the policy-making
opportunity that lies ahead to benefit the inhabitants of the
developing world, its implications obviously do not end there. For
decision makers here in the United States, it is vital to seize the
opportunity that is now emerging to adjust the legal regime that
governs pharmaceutical innovation and availability. Otherwise,
inhabitants of the developed world will also be left, like their
counterparts in the developing world, to face the seemingly limitless
costs of NCDs.

